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Brendan T. Beery 
Lading and Weight: Suggested Evidentiary Burdens in 
Senate Judicial-Nominee Hearings Post-Kavanaugh 
17 U.N.H. L. Rev. 229 (2019) 
A B S T R A C T .  The Senate proceedings occasioned by Dr. Christine Blasey Ford’s allegation against 
Justice Brett Kavanaugh left the then-nominee calling them a “circus” and observers confused 
about who was supposed to prove what and by what standard.  Since the Senate is ill-suited to 
sorting out cases and controversies (and since the Ford-Kavanaugh matter will surely not be the 
last of its kind), the Senate should adopt standards (burdens of proof) for future judicial-nominee 
proceedings that it borrows from a sister branch—the judiciary. 
In any proceeding, the burden must be laded—it must be determined which party has the 
burden in the first place.  It must also be weighted—it must be determined how much of a burden 
is to be imposed.  This lading and weighting takes place with regard to both the burden of making 
out a colorable claim (the burden of production) and also the threshold for deciding in a party’s 
favor (the burden of persuasion).  Courts often lade the burden of persuasion, in particular, on the 
party that (a) has the lesser interest at stake, (b) precipitates (as distinguished from initiates) the 
action, or (c) warrants special suspicion and scrutiny.  This Article applies these principles to 
Senate judicial-nominee proceedings, noting that those proceedings sometimes involve two 
separate inquiries: (1) the qualification (or general suitability) inquiry, and (2) the inquiry into any 
allegation of specific and potentially disqualifying wrongdoing.  The Article posits that, as to the 
qualification inquiry, the nominee has the burdens of production and persuasion and must show 
with convincing evidence that he or she is suitable for office.  As to the allegation inquiry, although 
the accuser should have the burden of producing credible evidence to establish a plausible claim 
of wrongdoing, sound principles mitigate against the accuser bearing the ultimate burden of 
persuasion.  That burden should rest with the nominee, who must show that the allegation is 
implausible, incredible, or unreasonable.  Finally, this Article proposes a sliding scale for 
determining the precise threshold of proof required to meet this burden, focusing on the three 
different levels of federal judicial appointments (district judge, circuit judge, and Supreme Court 
justice) and accounting for the different interests involved as to each. 
A U T H O R .  Professor of Law, Western Michigan University Thomas M. Cooley Law School.  B.A., 
Bradley University, 1995; J.D., summa cum laude, Thomas M. Cooley Law School, 1998.  The author 
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I NT R ODUC T I ON 
“Have we learned nothing since Anita Hill?”1  This was the ubiquitous question 
around the Brett Kavanaugh hearing after Dr. Christine Blasey Ford accused him of 
sexually assaulting her when the two were teens.2  In one sense, the answer seemed 
clear: not on Capitol Hill.3  To the extent that American culture has caught up to the 
misogynist reality through which women must navigate (and we have a long way to 
                                                                    




2  See Emma Ford, California Professor, Writer of Confidential Brett Kavanaugh Letter, Speaks Out 




3  A similar lament was heard after the Clarence Thomas hearings involving Hill.  See Anne C. 
Levy, The Anita Hill-Clarence Thomas Hearings, 1991 Wis. L. Rev. 1106, 1106–07 (1991) (“[W]hat is 
surprising is that the policymakers themselves, the United States Congress, also seemed to be 
largely ignorant about what courts and government agencies have known for some time—women 
are tired of the status quo . . . .”). 
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go in that regard, the “Me Too” movement notwithstanding),4 there has been that 
much inertia in what is supposed to be the greatest deliberative body in the history 
of republics: the United States Senate.5 
This has to do with the composition of that body.6  But it has also to do with the 
failure of the Senate to develop neutral guideposts to govern its own factfinding 
when its advice and consent function7 devolves into arbitrating salacious 
allegations. 
The structure of the Constitution is such that each of the three branches of the 
federal government is generally obligated to stay in its own lane.8  The legislative 
branch, obviously, exists to make law.  But the Senate, the upper chamber, has a 
strange parentage: it was born in one sense as an accident of history that compelled 
a “great compromise” among a confederation of states,9 and in another sense as a 
chamber where the whims of the mob would yield to a “sober second thought.”10  
                                                                    
4  See Sandra E. Garcia, The Woman Who Created #MeToo Long Before Hashtags, N.Y. Times (Oct. 
20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/20/us/me-too-movement-tarana-burke.html 
[https://perma.cc/RG8R-LKNN]; see also Eugene Scott, Revisiting Anita Hill in the Wake of the 
Kavanaugh Allegations, Wash. Post (Sept. 17, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics
/2018/09/17/revisiting-anita-hill-wake-kavanaugh-allegations/?utm_term=.6bbec162a7da [https:
//perma.cc/22MD-6XCN] (“The [Anita Hill and Christine Blasey Ford] stories aren’t identical, and 
neither are the times.  One big difference: . . . the #MeToo movement . . . .”). 
5  Cf. Claude Pepper, The Senate of the United States: Its History and Practice, 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1026, 
1026 (1939) (book review) (“Like democracy itself, . . . it is strong, it is sound at the core, it has 
survived many changes, it has saved the country many catastrophes, it is a safeguard against any 
form of tyranny . . . .”).  See generally M. Blane Michael, The Power of History to Stir a Man’s Blood: 
Senator Robert C. Byrd in the Line Item Veto Debate, 108 W. Va. L. Rev. 593 (2006) (discussing the 
history of legislative power and authority). 
6  On the Senate Judiciary Committee, at least, the majority side remains strikingly 
monochromatic and patriarchal.  See Richard Cowan, Senate’s Judiciary Committee, Then and Now, 
Reuters (Sept. 26, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-kavanaugh-committee
/senates-judiciary-committee-then-and-now-idUSKCN1M635A [https://perma.cc/7LCB-F4T8] 
(“[N]early three decades after the Thomas-Hill confrontation, the Judiciary Committee is still 
dominated by white males, including all 11 of its Republicans.”).  
7  See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2. 
8  See generally I.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (noting that the separation of powers 
requires all legislation be presented to the President before becoming law and that one segment 
of Congress cannot solely override executive power). 
9  See Jennifer Carr, Proportional Union or Paper Confederacy?, 48 Conn. L. Rev. 595, 599–600 
(2015).  
10  Tom Harkin, Fixing the Filibuster: Restoring Real Democracy in the Senate, 95 Iowa L. Rev. Bull. 
67, 77 (2010).  
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Whatever its origins and purposes, neither the Senate nor the Congress more 
generally was to be the place for resolving cases and controversies.11  That function 
falls to courts under Article III of the Constitution,12 not politicians toiling under 
Article I.13 
An allegation against an individual made by another individual under 
circumstances where the accused stands to pay a price is, in a sense, a case and 
controversy: it has parties, the parties are in an oppositional posture, and there 
exists a dispute about a discrete, factual episode.14  Thus, Congress is ill-suited to sit 
in judgment over such a matter;15 the function of sorting out cases and 
controversies is not a natural fit for pols driven more by Nietzsche’s “will to power”16 
than a neutral and untainted interest in drilling down to truth. 
That is why, if the Senate is to manage such matters, especially in an age of 
reality-television politics,17 it should adopt rules for handling such matters.  Being 
                                                                    
11  See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2; see also Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356–57 (1911) 
(explaining the Constitution’s meaning of judicial power over cases and controversies). 
12  U.S. Const. art. III, § 2.  
13  The notion that Congress was not intended as the arbiter of individual disputes or 
controversies is undergirded by the constitutional proscriptions against ex post facto laws or bills 
of attainder: the lawmaking function involves public policy and the public good, not the exercise 
of jurisdiction over the rights or conduct of individual persons in isolated instances.  See U.S. 
Const. art.1, § 9, cl. 3.   
14  See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, Realigning Parties, 2014 Utah L. Rev. 109, 127–
28 (2014). 
15  See Mollie Hemingway, The Kavanaugh Allegation Process Is a Miscarriage of Justice for Everyone, 
Federalist (Sept. 19, 2018), https://thefederalist.com/2018/09/19/the-kavanaugh-allegation-
process-is-a-miscarriage-of-justice-for-everyone/ [https://perma.cc/G5PV-K6F3] (opining about 
the allegations against Brett Kavanaugh by Dr. Ford that “the Senate is . . . an inappropriate place 
to litigate claims of sexual assault.  Since Maryland apparently doesn’t have a statute of limitations 
on felony sex assault, charges could still be filed there if the case is strong enough to do so”).  
16  See Anthony Carty, Nietzsche and Socrates/Or the Spirit of the Devil and the Law, 24 Cardozo L. 
Rev. 621, 622–23 (2003) (citing Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morality 28–29 
(Keith Ansell-Pearson ed., Carol Diethe trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994)).  
17  See Michael J. Gerhardt, Practice Makes Precedent, 131 Harv. L. Rev. F. 32, 37–38 (2017).   
Professor Gerhardt suggests: 
American politics is not that different from American reality television: preferences and tastes will dictate 
the winners and losers. The fact that we have a former reality television star in the Oval Office is a 
reminder that what we see on television might not differ much, if at all, from reality. It reminds us how 
much playing to an audience matters in our lives and politics, and how political or constitutional conflicts 
play out in the media. Thus, in the contemporary fight to control the Supreme Court, the judges 
themselves become the “contestants”; the senators become the judges; the contestants tailor their 
performances to suit the judges; the senators proclaim to the audience their reasons for voting one way 
or another; and at the end the audience, the public, shouts its approval or disapproval of the final vote. 
L A D I N G  A N D  W E I G H T  
233 
ill-suited to that task by design, it should borrow those rules from its sister branch, 
the judiciary. 
Justice Kavanaugh seemed to be onto something when he claimed, during his 
confirmation hearings, that the existing paradigm yielded “a circus.”18  We might 
aim for something less embarrassing and better thought-out in the future.  One of 
the more troubling shortcomings in the Kavanaugh hearings (all two of them—one 
a general hearing about his suitability as a Supreme Court Justice and the other a 
special hearing about Dr. Ford’s allegation) was the rampant confusion around the 
hearing on Dr. Ford’s allegation about who was supposed to prove what and by what 
standard.19 
To manage a legal case, a tribunal must assign burdens of proof in two different 
dimensions as applied to (at least) two different stages.20  As to the two dimensions, 
first, in any given proceeding, the burden must be laded;21 that is, it must be 
determined which party has the burden and which party does not.22  Second, it must 
be weighted; that is, it must be determined how much of a burden is to be imposed.23  
As to the two stages, this lading and weighting must be undertaken with regard to 
                                                                    
The outcome is either popular or unpopular, but the judges’ rulings are (usually) final. 
Id.  
18  Kavanaugh Hearing: Transcript, Wash. Post (Sept. 27, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/national/wp/2018/09/27/kavanaugh-hearing-transcript/?utm_
term=.9d4b94e8b0fd [https://perma.cc/LG7Q-FACS] [hereinafter Kavanaugh Transcript]. 
19  See, e.g., Caprice Roberts, Kavanaugh’s Senate Hearing Isn’t a Trial. The Standard Isn’t Reasonable 
Doubt, Wash. Post (Sept. 21, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/kavanaughs-
senate-hearing-isnt-a-trial-the-standard-isnt-reasonable-doubt/2018/09/20/1eb1ee34-bd15-11e8-
b7d2-0773aa1e33da_story.html?utm_term=.d34cf2be0c1d [https://perma.cc/86YR-UVNJ] 
[hereinafter Roberts, Hearing Isn’t a Trial]. 
20  See Louis Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1179, 1180, 1186 (2013) [hereinafter 
Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication] (“[M]ultistage legal procedures are ubiquitous, vary tremendously 
across legal systems, and constitute one of the most important institutional features of 
adjudication.”). 
21  I note here that no other commentator, to my knowledge, has used the word lade in this 
context, but it seems the best word available in our language.  Lade means, “[t]o put a load or 
burden in or on; put freight or cargo in or on; load; also, figuratively, to weigh down; oppress; 
common only in the past participle laden; as trees laden with fruit.”  Funk and Wagnalls New 
Standard Dictionary (1923).  
22  See Barbara D. Underwood, The Thumb on the Scales of Justice: Burdens of Persuasion in Criminal 
Cases, 86 Yale L.J. 1299, 1299–1300 (1977) (“[The] burden is said to have both a location and a weight: 
the location specifies the party that loses if the burden is not met, and the weight specifies how 
persuasive the evidence must be . . . to carry the burden.”). 
23  See id. at 1300. 
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both the burden or responsibility of producing evidence in the first place, (this is 
typically called the burden of production24) and also the burden of reaching an 
appropriate evidentiary threshold that would permit a tribunal to ultimately decide 
the matter in favor of one party or the other (this is typically called the burden of 
persuasion25). 
Theoretically, one party may be laded with the burden at one stage and the other 
laded with the burden at the next stage,26 and the weight of evidence required is 
typically heavier as to the burden of persuasion (because it involves deciding the 
ultimate outcome in a case) than it is as to the burden of production, which typically 
involves only whether a party has made out a colorable case that should proceed 
further.27  And certainly, “[b]oth sides cannot have the burden of proof on the same 
issue.  The whole point of assigning the burden of proof is to identify the party who 
loses if the evidence is inadequate.”28 
Consider a mundane illustration.  A parent has told two children, Adam and 
Bernie, that whoever finishes his homework first will get to pick what movie the 
family watches later in the evening.  Bernie reports finishing his homework at 5:30, 
and Adam at 5:45.  Adam, however, levels a devastating accusation: Bernie cheated 
Adam out of choosing the movie by lying about finishing his homework first.  The 
                                                                    
24  See John T. McNaughton, Burden of Production of Evidence: A Function of Burden of Persuasion, 68 
Harv. L. Rev. 1382, 1383 (1955) [hereinafter McNaughton, Burden of Production] (“[B]urden of 
production describes the onus cast upon one party or the other during the trial by a comparison 
of the above standard with the evidence actually adduced.  The onus can of course be on only one 
party at a time.”); see also Thomas E. Raccuia, Note, RLUIPA and Exclusionary Zoning: Government 
Defendants Should Have the Burden of Persuasion in Equal Terms Cases, 80 Fordham L. Rev. 1853, 1862 
(2012) [hereinafter Raccuia, Exclusionary Zoning]. 
25  See McNaughton, Burden of Production, supra note 24, at 1382–83; see also Raccuia, Exclusionary 
Zoning, supra note 24, at 1862. 
26  See Candace S. Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination After Price Waterhouse and Wards 
Cove: Semantics and Substance, 39 Am. U. L. Rev. 615, 623–24 (1990) [hereinafter Kovacic-Fleischer, 
Proving Discrimination]. 
27  See Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, supra note 20, at 1189 (“The choice at the first stage is 
between termination (an immediate judgment of no liability) and continuation.  Continuation is 
taken to entail costs but to generate additional information that is used to reach a final 
determination of liability at the second stage . . . .”); see also Raccuia, Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 
24, at 1862 (“The burden of persuasion, by contrast, is a higher standard.  In most civil actions, it 
requires a party to establish the truth of a given proposition by a preponderance of the evidence.  
A party with this burden bears the ultimate risk of non-persuasion; in other words, he prevails 
only if he convinces the fact-finder that he is correct.” (footnotes omitted)).   
28  George Rutherglen, Fisher II Whose Burden, What Proof?, 20 Green Bag 2d 19, 20 (2016) 
[hereinafter Rutherglen, Whose Burden]. 
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parent must now decide which child—Adam or Bernie—to lade with the burden of 
production.  It hardly seems appropriate that Bernie should have the burden.  After 
all, Adam is the one making the accusation, Adam stands to gain if his accusation is 
believed, and Bernie is the one who will suffer if Adam’s accusation is true.  
Therefore, the parent would likely lade Adam, the accuser, with the burden of 
production: Adam must produce some evidence beyond his mere assertion.  The 
parent must then also decide what quantum of evidence must be produced—not to 
establish Bernie’s guilt, but to warrant further inquiry.  Must Adam have been an 
eyewitness to Bernie’s diabolical nonfeasance, or will circumstantial evidence 
suffice?  Will the parent rely on Adam’s word alone as to the factual basis of his 
allegation, or must Adam produce a corroborating witness before his charge is 
taken seriously? 
Suppose that the parent (in his or her own mind, of course; we routinely apply 
quasi-legal analyses in our everyday lives without doing so explicitly or even 
consciously) settles on a standard of credible circumstantial evidence: if Adam can 
produce that quantum of evidence, then the inquiry is on.  Adam says (testifies, in a 
sense), with a bearing bespeaking honesty and solemnity, that he has circumstantial 
evidence. He knows that Bernie was assigned a book report as homework, and he 
avers that Bernie could not have completed the report by 5:30.  He also claims that, 
in any event, the book Bernie was supposed to be reporting about was on Adam’s 
desk during the entire time Bernie was “doing his homework.” 
Many parents would likely agree that the lading and weighting will shift as we 
enter the burden of persuasion stage of this whole sordid affair: now it is Bernie 
who has the burden, and as to the weight of evidence required, he will have to 
produce conclusive evidence that he did his homework—probably in the form of a 
completed book report.  This shift makes sense under the circumstances.  The 
parent is justifiably suspicious of the newly laded party, Bernie; the interest in 
Bernie finishing his homework outweighs any interest Bernie might have in picking 
a movie to watch; and it was Bernie’s declaration that he’d finished his homework 
first—a precipitating event reflecting his own self-interest—that really initiated the 
problem, even though Adam was the one who originally complained. 
Moving from the mundane to the more ethereal, in Part I of this Article, I 
explain how courts typically decide which party to lade with the evidentiary burden.  
As to the burden of production, courts typically lade the burden on the party alleging 
wrongdoing,29 which seems to make sense.  As to the burden of persuasion, courts 
often lade this burden on the party that (a) has the lesser interest at stake (with 
careful attention to whether society in general has any real interest in the outcome); 
                                                                    
29  See Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination, supra note 26, at 621–22. 
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(b) initiates the action or proceeding—or, critically, precipitates the action or 
proceeding—for the purpose of vindicating its own self-interest; or (c) warrants 
special suspicion and scrutiny given the nature of the cause of action or claim at 
issue.30  
In Part II, I discuss the weighting of the burdens in different contexts and 
proceedings, some at the pre-litigation stages of a case and some at the litigation 
stage.  In particular, Part II surveys evidentiary thresholds typically associated with 
establishing credibility or a reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing that would warrant 
further investigation; initiating a formal proceeding (or stating a claim, one might 
say); establishing cause to proceed to litigation; and trial.  I ask in Part II whether 
any of these weights or standards is a good fit in the context of judicial-nominee 
proceedings and suggest that the Senate might opt for more appropriate standards 
given the unique interests and constitutional functions involved. 
In Part III, I apply these principles, concluding that judicial-nominee 
proceedings, when they include issues like those that arose in the Anita Hill and 
Christine Blasey Ford matters, involve two separate inquiries: (1) the qualification 
(or general suitability) inquiry; and (2) the inquiry into any allegation of specific and 
potentially disqualifying wrongdoing.  Part III posits that, as to the qualification 
inquiry, the nominee has the burdens of production and persuasion and must show 
with convincing evidence that he or she is appropriately credentialed and suitable 
for office.  As to the allegation inquiry, although the accuser should have the burden 
of producing credible evidence to establish a plausible claim of wrongdoing, the 
principles discussed in Parts I and II mitigate against the accuser having the 
ultimate burden of persuasion.  That burden should rest with the nominee, who 
must show that the allegation is implausible, incredible, or unreasonable.  Part III 
proposes a sliding scale for determining the precise threshold (or weight) of proof 
required to meet this burden, focusing on the three different levels of federal 
judicial appointments (district judge, circuit judge, and Supreme Court Justice) and 
accounting for the different interests involved as to each. 
I .  L ADI NG 
Lading, as I use the term here, refers to the process of determining which party 
has the burden—not how much of a burden is to be imposed.  This process must take place 
both as to producing evidence that warrants further inquiry and also persuading 
the factfinder, at the conclusion of any inquiry, to find for one side or the other.  The 
reader will notice throughout the Article, however, that there is some overlap in 
                                                                    
30  See infra Part I, section B and accompanying notes.  
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analyzing which party should be laded, and what weight of evidence should be 
required. 
A.  Factors That Commentators Have Suggested 
Commentators have taken a stab at identifying factors that tribunals and 
lawmakers consider in lading burdens of proof—both as to the burden of 
production and the burden of persuasion—but with little success in identifying 
concrete guideposts: 
The treatise writers agree that no one principle governs how courts allocate 
burdens of persuasion and production.  The writers note that courts should consider 
issues of policy, convenience, fairness, and probability.  Policy issues include factors 
such as burdening the plaintiff because that person seeks to change the status quo or 
burdening the defendant when certain defenses are disfavored or unusual.  Included 
under convenience and fairness issues are factors such as who has knowledge and 
access to information and whether the burden follows the natural order of storytelling.  
Authorities agree, however, that access to information should not be overrated as a 
reason for allocating burdens because fairness may override an issue of access to 
information. . . .  
As with burdens of persuasion, no uniform rule exists to direct allocation of 
burdens of production.  Courts use the same factors that they consider in allocating 
burdens of persuasion, which ultimately rest on broad policy considerations.  Although 
the party with the burden of persuasion usually has the burden of production, situations 
arise which necessitate splitting the burdens.  If the plaintiff provides evidence 
sufficient to require the fact finder to rule for the plaintiff, then the burden of 
production may shift to the defendant.  In that case, the defendant may also have the 
burden of persuasion.31 
1.   The Burden of Production 
Care should be taken to differentiate between discrete meanings of the term 
burden of proof: 
The phrase “burden of proof” is often used to refer to two concepts, burden of 
production and burden of persuasion.  The burden of proof is more frequently used to 
refer to the latter concept, which is also referred to as the risk of nonpersuasion.  As the 
names of the terms indicate, a burden of production is merely a burden that requires a 
party to produce evidence.  The burden of persuasion requires the party to prove to the 
fact finder the truth or existence of those facts for which the party has the burden.32 
The burden of producing evidence is, as an informal and practical matter, a 
burden that may seesaw back and forth throughout a legal proceeding as evidence 
                                                                    
31  Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination, supra note 26, at 622–24 (footnotes omitted).  
32  Id. at 620 (footnotes omitted).  
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is developed and presented by both sides: 
A plaintiff initially will be required to produce evidence of a defendant’s negligence in 
an action for negligent tort.  At some point he may have produced so much evidence, of 
such convincing force, that the defendant must offer conflicting evidence or lose on the 
issue of his negligence.  As a practical matter, once reasonable [jurors] may find [the] 
defendant negligent, he should introduce evidence to show he was not negligent or run 
the risk of incurring liability.  As a legal matter, once reasonable jurors must find the 
defendant negligent, he must introduce evidence to show he was not negligent, or 
liability will be imposed, absent some limiting factor like contributory negligence.  At 
that point, the burden of producing evidence on the issue of negligence has shifted to 
the defendant.  Conceivably, the defendant could shift the burden of producing 
evidence back to the plaintiff by introducing overwhelmingly probative evidence that 
he was not negligent.  Thus, as everyone agrees, the burden of producing evidence may 
shift back and forth throughout the [proceeding].33  
Be that as it may, as applied to judicial-nominee hearings, we’re concerned 
mostly with which party has the burden of producing evidence (beyond a mere 
allegation34) in the first instance, because there are no evidentiary motions, trials, 
or appeals in a judicial-nominee proceeding.  In most legal proceedings, for reasons 
that border on self-evident, the initial burden of producing evidence is laded on the 
party making the allegation and seeking the attention of investigative or law-
enforcement agencies or tribunals—normally a plaintiff (or, at the law-
enforcement level, an accuser or a complaining witness).  “Law students are 
generally taught that the plaintiff must plead and prove the elements of plaintiff’s 
prima facie case and that the defendant must plead and prove affirmative 
defenses.”35  And “[a]s litigators know, the allocation of burdens of production and 
persuasion can determine the outcome of the case.  If the plaintiff has the burden 
of production and does not produce evidence, the plaintiff’s suit will be 
dismissed.”36 
The concern that a high-profile appointment like a Supreme Court nomination 
will bring politically or ideologically motivated false allegations to the fore was 
expressed vociferously by supporters of Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s nomination,37 
                                                                    
33  Roger B. Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 1151, 1159 (1972). 
34  See Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Aff. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.9 (1981) (“An articulation not 
admitted into evidence will not suffice.”).  
35  Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination, supra note 26, at 621–22 (footnotes omitted). 
36  Id. at 621 (footnotes omitted). 
37  See, e.g., Richard Cowan & Steve Holland, Amid Kavanaugh Fight, Trump Says It Is a “Scary Time” 
for Young Men, Reuters (Oct. 2, 2018, 12:52 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-
kavanaugh/amid-kavanaugh-fight-trump-says-it-is-a-scary-time-for-young-men-idUSKCN1MC
2A3 [https://perma.cc/9SD8-3UML]; Anna North, #HimToo: The Online Movement Spreading Myths 
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and indeed by Justice Kavanaugh himself during his Senate testimony: 
This confirmation process has become a national disgrace.  The Constitution gives 
the Senate an important role in the confirmation process, but you have replaced advice 
and consent with search and destroy. 
. . . . 
This whole two-week effort has been a calculated and orchestrated political hit, 
fueled with apparent pent-up anger about President Trump and the 2016 election.  Fear 
that has been unfairly stoked about my judicial record.  Revenge on behalf of the 
Clintons.  And millions of dollars in money from outside left-wing opposition groups.38 
Although Justice Kavanaugh’s outburst was panned in some circles as 
disqualifying for its partisanship and ill temper,39 it did summarize a widespread 
suspicion among conservatives that activists’ insistence that survivors of alleged 
sexual assaults be heeded was rhetorical chaff deployed to mislead the public in a 
“hit job” designed to raze a good man’s character.40  Leaving aside the unique and 
controversial nature of allegations about sexual misconduct, certainly no mere 
allegation without more should ever cause the accused to suffer in any concrete way.  
Were this not so, we would each have arbitrary power and jurisdiction over the fates 
of our neighbors (and each of those neighbors over each of us) that surely no person 
ever enjoyed in a state of nature.41 
                                                                    
About False Rape Allegations, Explained, Vox (Oct. 10, 2018, 3:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/policy-
and-politics/2018/10/10/17957126/himtoo-movement-pieter-hanson-tweet-me-too [https://
perma.cc/7T3P-E4JC]. 
38  Kavanaugh Transcript, supra note 18. 
39  See, e.g., Andrew Cohen, Brett Kavanaugh Has Already Disqualified Himself, New Republic 
(Sept. 24, 2018), https://newrepublic.com/article/151359/brett-kavanaugh-already-disqualified 
[https://perma.cc/Q5HR-K3T4]; see also Elizabeth Preza, Retired Supreme Court Justice Says 
Kavanaugh’s Behavior at the Senate Hearings Disqualifies Him: Senators Should Pay Attention to This, 
AlterNet (Oct. 4, 2018), https://www.alternet.org/retired-supreme-court-justice-says-
kavanaughs-behavior-senate-hearing-disqualifies-him-senators [https://perma.cc/7Q2M-2V3D] 
(“John Paul Stevens, a retired United States Supreme Court justice who was appointed by former 
President Gerald Ford, on Thursday issued a stunning statement about Brett Kavanaugh’s 
temperament, telling ‘a small crowd in Boca Raton that Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s performance at 
confirmation hearings should disqualify him’ . . . .”). 
40  See, e.g., Matt Vespa, Let’s Be Honest: The Kavanaugh Allegations Are Nothing More Than A Political 
Hit Job, Townhall (Sept. 24, 2018, 1:02 PM), https://townhall.com/tipsheet/mattvespa/2018/09
/24/the-kavanaugh-allegations-really-look-like-nothing-more-than-a-political-hit-job-n2522015 
[https://perma.cc/U77U-UDHC] (“As I’ve said before, this has all the makings of a political hit job 
of the vilest kind.  Democrats are using unprovable allegations to delay the process.”). 
41  The reference here is to John Locke, who opined that “the individual, in a state of nature, is 
autonomous and sovereign over himself or herself,” and that no person has “jurisdiction [over 
another’s] property or . . . peaceful enjoyment of [one’s] own life and . . . personal affairs.”  Brendan 
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So what is required, beyond a mere allegation, is evidence, and that evidence 
must be produced by someone; and as a practical matter, the party in the best position 
to produce the evidence is the one who is most likely to possess it: the accuser.42  
There seems much confusion, however, about what is meant by the word “evidence” 
in the legal context.  As one commentator opined: 
The “burden of proof” issue is the crux of the debate surrounding Dr. Ford’s 
accusations against Judge Kavanaugh precisely because she has produced no evidence 
to support her accusations against him.  She has no physical evidence, though that is 
unsurprising given that she is alleging a three-decades-old-crime. . . .  
In sum, Dr. Ford’s accusation against Kavanaugh is unsupported save for the 
accusation itself, and those who say that she told them about Kavanaugh in the last 
handful of years, three decades after the alleged incident.43 
This was a common narrative, and it was also “pure applesauce,” or, if you 
prefer, evidentiary “jiggery-pokery.”44  Eyewitness testimony is evidence, and the 
eyewitness testimony of a traumatized victim (who, as Dr. Ford herself explained, 
is likely to have an accurate recall of the traumatizing events seared into her 
memory45), can be especially reliable evidence.46  If this kind of testimony is not 
evidence (and arguably compelling evidence), then we had best open the gates to 
our prisons and empty a good number of the detainees warehoused therein back 
onto the streets.47 
                                                                    
T. Beery, How to Argue Liberty Cases in a Post-Kennedy World: It’s Not about Individual Rights, But State 
Power and the Social Compact, 75 Nat’l Law. Guild Rev. 1, 6–7 (2018) [hereinafter Beery, How to 
Argue]. 
42  See Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination, supra note 26, at 622–24 (footnotes omitted). 
43  Adam J. White, The Democrats’ “Flight 93” Nomination, Wkly. Standard (Sept. 26, 2018, 8:06 
AM), https://www.weeklystandard.com/adam-j-white/brett-kavanaugh-christine-blasey-ford-
and-the-senates-burden-of-proof [https://perma.cc/5U5R-5RYJ] [hereinafter White, Flight 93].  
44  See David Gespass et al, Putting Scalia in Perspective, 73 Nat’l Law. Guild Rev. 245, 251 (quoting 
King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2501 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
45  See Kavanaugh Transcript, supra note 18.  
46  See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977) (explaining that indicia of eyewitness 
reliability “include the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the 
witness’[s] degree of attention, the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of 
certainty demonstrated at the confrontation, and the time between the crime and the 
confrontation”).  “Against these factors is to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive 
identification itself.”  Id.  
47  See Eyewitness Misidentification, Innocence Project, https://www.innocenceproject.org
/causes/eyewitness-misidentification [https://perma.cc/QZE2-UXKV] (last visited Feb. 2, 2019) 
(“Despite solid and growing proof of the inaccuracy of traditional eyewitness ID procedures – and 
the availability of simple measures to reform them – traditional eyewitness identifications remain 
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It is certainly true that the story of a witness, told in an unsworn setting, subject 
to no penalty for its potential dishonesty and made no part of the record in any kind 
of formal proceeding, does not constitute evidence.  The same cannot be said, 
however, when the same story is told under oath and submitted as the truth under 
penalty of perjury in the context of just such a formal proceeding (and, in most 
cases, subject to cross-examination or skeptical scrutiny, to boot).48  In the context 
of sexual-assault allegations, there was a time when special evidentiary 
requirements attached and witness testimony alone would not suffice, but that time 
has passed: 
Like the traditional prompt complaint requirement, the corroboration 
requirement has also been almost eradicated from formal rape law.  Only three states . 
. . continue to impose a corroboration requirement in their criminal codes for certain 
sexual offenses. . . . 
. . . . 
Fourteen other state codes indicate that corroboration of a sexual offense 
complainant’s testimony is not required.  The remaining thirty-three states’ codes are 
silent on the issue of corroboration.  However, case law from each of these states 
indicates that corroboration of the complainant’s testimony is not ordinarily required.  
Twenty-two states . . . allow a defendant to be convicted of rape based on the 
uncorroborated testimony of the complainant.  Twelve states and the District of 
Columbia appear to qualify a general rule that no corroboration is required.  For 
example, in Alaska, when a complainant of sexual abuse later recants her allegation, the 
state must produce corroborating evidence to support the original allegation.  In 
Arizona, corroboration may be needed when the witness’ story is physically impossible 
or incredible.  Oklahoma and West Virginia require corroboration only when the 
complainant’s testimony is inherently improbable.  In Kansas and Kentucky, the 
complainant’s testimony need not be corroborated if it is clear and convincing and not 
unbelievable.  In Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, and the District of Columbia, 
corroboration is not required except to explain inconsistencies within the 
complainant’s testimony.  Wisconsin requires corroboration when the complainant’s 
                                                                    
among the most commonly used and compelling evidence brought against criminal 
defendants.”); accord John Bohannon, Eyewitness Testimony May Only Be Credible Under These 
Circumstances, Science (Dec. 21, 2015, 3:00 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/12
/eyewitness-testimony-may-only-be-credible-under-these-circumstances [https://perma.cc
/JRU5-EPBR] (“Courts may be ‘leaving more criminals on the streets and putting more innocent 
people behind bars than they should be.’”) [hereinafter Bohannon, Eyewitness Testimony].  
48  See Taylor v. Neven, No. 2:07-CV-00183-KJD-RJ, 2010 WL 3001633, at *18 n.84 (D. Nev. July 27, 
2010) (stating that a party’s “purported unsworn recantations to investigators clearly would not 
constitute reliable evidence . . . particularly [if] she did not follow through with any such alleged 
recantation when called under oath and subject to cross[]examination”). 
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testimony is unreliable.49  
A number of principles emerge from this summary.  First, the testimony of a 
victim, as an eyewitness to the crime committed against him or her, is obviously 
evidence (and direct evidence, one might add50) upon which a criminal conviction 
(let alone a mere finding that a judicial nominee is disqualified for service on a 
federal court) may rest.51  This didn’t stop Senator Jeff Flake from opining, in the 
midst of the Ford-Kavanaugh hearings, “[w]hat I do know is that our system of 
justice affords a presumption of innocence to the accused, absent corroborating 
evidence.  That is what binds us to the rule of law.  While some may argue that a 
different standard should apply regarding the Senate’s advice and consent 
responsibilities, I believe that the [C]onstitution’s provisions of fairness and due 
process apply here as well.”52  Second, a victim-witness need only produce 
corroborating evidence when his or her accusation seems physically impossible or 
manifestly implausible.53 
So as to any allegation of wrongdoing, the burden of production normally 
does—and probably should—rest with the accuser, and that burden may be met 
with the production of sworn testimony or other evidence that lays a plausible 
predicate for the allegation.54  As to the nature of the evidence produced, one 
supposes that it should relate, among other things, to such factors as motive, 
opportunity, and capability.55  Yet, as to other matters (that is, matters other than 
                                                                    
49  Michelle J. Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement, Corroboration 
Requirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84 B.U. L. Rev. 945, 968–73 (2004) 
[hereinafter Anderson, The Legacy] (footnotes omitted). 
50  See Donald F. Paine, Direct Versus Circumstantial Evidence, 48 Tenn. B.J. 31 (Oct. 2012) (“Direct 
evidence is ‘based on personal knowledge or observation . . . that, if true, proves a fact without 
inference or presumption.’  Circumstantial evidence is ‘based on inference and not on personal 
knowledge or observation.’  Eyewitness testimony describing commission of a crime 
is direct evidence.  The alleged perpetrator’s flight from a crime scene is circumstantial evidence.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
51  See Anderson, The Legacy, supra note 49, at 968–73.  
52  Aaron Keller, Jeff Flake’s Kavanaugh Endorsement Is Based on an Incorrect Legal Standard, 
Lawfare (Sept. 29, 2018, 10:08 AM), https://lawandcrime.com/legal-analysis/jeff-flakes-
kavanaugh-endorsement-is-based-on-an-incorrect-legal-standard/ [https://perma.cc/6CL6-
GLKJ] (emphasis added).  
53  See Anderson, The Legacy, supra note 49, at 968–73. 
54  See id. 
55  This can be conceptualized as “corroborating evidence” as well, and it may range “from 
weak—the suspect was known to be close to the scene of the crime—to strong—the suspect’s 
shoes matched a footprint at the scene.” Bohannon, Eyewitness Testimony, supra note 47; see also 
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accusations of specific wrongdoing) that require the production of evidence—like 
the qualification inquiry involved in a judicial-nominee hearing, for example—the 
burden of production should be laded on the party that is asking for something (the 
nominee) and who is most likely to have access to whatever evidence and 
information is required (again, the nominee).56 
2. The Burden of Persuasion 
As Professor Kovacic-Fleischer notes above, the burden of persuasion need not 
be laded on the same party laded with the burden of production.57  And as she 
elucidates in her summary of existing standards, the lading of the burden of 
persuasion (once the party alleging wrongdoing has produced enough evidence to 
make out a claim) hardly involves a well-structured, rigid, or formally realizable 
application of concrete principles.58  That is not to say that such principles do not 
exist, and try we must to discover them—a task made easier with a focus on the 
special problems associated with a judicial-nominee proceeding where the interests 
and temporal markers involved are relatively easily discernible. 
For the sake of clarity, here is a summary of the prevailing factors identified by 
Professor Kovacic-Fleischer, bullet-pointed for ease of application later in the 
Article.  Lawmakers should assess the following: 
§ Which party “seeks to change the status quo” or raise issues that “are 
disfavored or unusual.” 
§ Which party “has knowledge and access to information.” 
§ “Whether the burden follows the natural order of storytelling.”59  
                                                                    
Laurence J. Alison et. al., Why Tough Tactics Fail and Rapport Gets Results: Observing Rapport-Based 
Interpersonal Techniques (Orbit) to Generate Useful Information from Terrorists, 19 Psychol. Pub. Pol’y 
& L. 411, 417 (2013) [hereinafter Alison, Tough Tactics] (“Suspect behavior was also measured to 
reflect the amount of useful information from the interview. . . . It is measured in relation to 
information which is of evidential significance . . . . Responses are coded across the following 
categories, which were highlighted by tactical interviewing advisors during consultation with the 
research team: capability (ability to commit offense); opportunity (circumstance allowing 
commission of offense); motive (reason to commit the offense); and descriptions (details about 
people, locations, actions and times that may be related to the offense).”). 
56  See infra Part III, section B (2). 
57  See Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination, supra note 26, at 622–24; accord Raccuia, 
Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 24, at 1862 (“In some cases, . . . once the party charged with the 
burden of production establishes a prima facie case, the burden of persuasion shifts to the 
opposing party.”). 
58  See Kovacic-Fleischer, Proving Discrimination, supra note 26, at 622–24. 
59  See id.  
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These factors seem adequate—as a starting point, at least—in lading the 
burden of persuasion in a garden-variety case, but they do not account for the 
gravity of the interests involved in a federal judicial-nominee hearing.  Obviously, 
federal judges serve for life (during “good [b]ehaviour”) and cannot have their 
compensation reduced while in office.60  More to the point, they rule on cases and 
controversies that implicate more far-reaching consequences than a fight between 
or among competing private parties in a case for civil damages or a tangle between 
the state and a defendant in the typical criminal case.61  All Article III judges have 
the power of judicial review, meaning the power to rule on the constitutionality of 
the act of a coordinate branch or of a state.62  As to federal district court judges, the 
reach of this power may be limited to the parties before the court, but that is hardly 
any limit at all when one of the parties is the United States of America or one of the 
fifty states.63  And Supreme Court justices, of course, exercise judicial supremacy, 
which is the power to bind up not just all lower courts, state and federal, throughout 
the United States, but also to bind up all state actors throughout the United States.64  
(Just ask Kim Davis).65 
B.  Other Factors to Consider in Lading Burdens of Proof 
With all this in mind, it doesn’t seem that the mundane factors summarized 
above will do.  We might also look to more fateful cases involving matters of grave 
public concern—cases involving not just the plight of an individual out to exact or 
preserve a pound of flesh, but rather the application of fundamental rights against 
the government, the interests of equality and fairness in constitutional cases, and 
the preservation of sacrosanct constitutional principles against political mischief 
and overreach.  These other issues, and the considerations courts take into account 
                                                                    
60  See U.S. Const. art. III, § 1.  
61  See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
62  See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
63  See, e.g., Martha Bellisle, Federal Judge Puts Temporary Hold on Trump’s Travel Ban Nationwide, 
Business Insider (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.businessinsider.com/seattle-judge-blocks-trump-
immigration-ban-2017-2 [https://perma.cc/US9L-WRVP].  
64  See generally Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (explaining that all state legislators must act in 
accordance with the federal Constitution since the federal Constitution is the “supreme Law of 
the Land” as declared in Article VI). 
65  See Joshua J. Schroeder, America’s Written Constitution: Remembering the Judicial Duty to Say 
What the Law Is, 43 Cap. U. L. Rev. 833, 867 n.215 (2015) (discussing briefly a Kentucky government 
employee who refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples after the Supreme Court 
ruled that same-sex couples had the right to marry). 
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in analyzing them, more closely approximate the grave and widespread public 
concerns in play around judicial-nominee proceedings. 
In this section (Part I, section B), I will focus mainly on the lading of the burden 
of persuasion, but I will also refer to the burden of production when appropriate.  
As we will see below, in cases involving the broad public interest, courts typically 
lade the burden of persuasion on the party that (a) has the lesser interest at stake 
(with careful attention to whether society in general has any real interest in the 
outcome); (b) initiates the action or proceeding—or, critically, precipitates the 
action or proceeding—for the purpose of vindicating its own self-interest; or (c) 
warrants special suspicion and scrutiny given the nature of the cause of action or 
claim at issue.66 
Constitutional legal tests come in different varieties, among them “elements, 
factors, balancing tests, means-ends tests, and categorical tests.”67  For purposes of 
this Article, I will pay particular attention to means-ends tests and balancing tests, 
because it is in the context of these species of legal tests that the Court has spent 
much time explaining which party has the burden of persuasion.68 
1. The Party with the Lesser Interest 
a. Means-Ends Tests 
One constitutional doctrine in particular involves the lading of burdens based 
on the importance of the interests at stake: 
The doctrine of substantive due process breathes life into the Ninth Amendment’s 
promise that “[t]he enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be 
construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.”  Since both of the 
Constitution’s due process provisions use the word liberty, courts have regarded those 
clauses as the textual homes for the unenumerated (retained) rights whose existence 
was memorialized in the Ninth Amendment.69 
Under this doctrine, courts consider whether certain governmental laws or 
policies run afoul of fundamental unenumerated rights.70  A law or policy that does 
substantially interfere with the exercise of a fundamental right survives only if the 
law or policy serves a compelling governmental interest and employs the least 
                                                                    
66  See infra Part I, section B (1–3) and accompanying notes. 
67  Brendan T. Beery & Daniel R. Ray, Five Different Species of Legal Tests—And What They All Have 
in Common, 37 Quinnipiac L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2019). 
68  See infra Part I, section B (1) (a & b) and accompanying notes. 
69  Beery, How to Argue, supra note 41, at 1–2 (alteration in original) (citing U.S. Const. amend. 
IX; U.S. Const. amend. V; U.S. Const. amend. XIV). 
70  See id. at 2 (citing Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). 
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restrictive means possible—means that are “narrowly tailored.”71  This formulation 
is an exacting means-ends test.72  The question has arisen, of course, which party in 
such a case has the burden of showing what?  As one commentator, Professor 
Russell W. Galloway, Jr., put it: 
A claimant seeking redress for an alleged violation of substantive due process must 
initially meet three preliminary requirements.  First, the court must have jurisdiction 
over the claim.  Second, the claim must be justiciable.  Third, the conduct giving rise to 
the claim must be government action.  Failure to demonstrate any of these 
requirements normally results in dismissal without reaching the merits of the 
substantive due process claim.73 
Professor Galloway’s summary here seems mostly to implicate the lading of the 
burden of production: certain evidentiary thresholds—mostly involving more 
technical matters but nonetheless requiring the production of evidence—must be 
met before a court may get to the business of sorting out the real issue (whether a 
constitutional provision has been violated)—and the party to be laded with the 
burden of persuasion. 
To decide whether a right or liberty interest is sufficiently important to warrant 
treatment as a fundamental right and trigger strict scrutiny, the Supreme Court has 
considered several factors: “[t]he most important test is whether the right has been 
traditionally recognized as fundamental in American society.  Another test is 
whether the right is inherent in any scheme of ordered liberty.  The practical 
importance of the right also has been a factor in some cases.”74 
Applying these factors, the Supreme Court has identified a number of 
fundamental rights, both under substantive due process principles and also, in 
some cases, as a component of equal protection: 
By far the most important fundamental right in substantive due process law is the 
so-called right of privacy.  This right includes the right to possess and use 
contraceptives, the right to terminate a pregnancy, the right not to be sterilized, the 
right to choose a marriage partner, the right to choose family living arrangements, the 
right to send one’s child to a parochial school, the right to have one’s child study a 
foreign language, and the freedom of intimate association. 
. . . . 
                                                                    
71  See Russell W. Galloway, Jr., Basic Substantive Due Process Analysis, 26 U.S.F. L. Rev. 625, 626–
27, 649 (1992) [hereinafter Galloway, Basic Due Process]. 
72  See id. at 627.  
73  Id. at 626 (footnotes omitted). 
74  Id. at 634 (footnotes omitted); see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 762, 767 (Souter, 
J., concurring) (citations omitted) (explaining that a finding that a right is fundamental in rank 
triggers “strict scrutiny”). 
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Equal protection cases define the term “fundamental rights” as those rights 
“explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by the Constitution.”  This definition sweeps a 
number of additional rights into substantive due process.  For example, the right to be 
free from punitive incarceration without trial and conviction is a fundamental right.  
Similarly, the Court has suggested that the right to travel is a fundamental right, 
although this view has been questioned in later cases.  Further, the Court has recognized 
several fundamental rights, including interstate migration, equal voting weight, and 
ballot access, in equal protection cases.75 
Fundamental rights, then, are interests that courts view as inherently more 
important than any likely governmental interest in snuffing them out.76   That is 
why, to overcome a challenge to a law or policy that substantially interferes with the 
exercise of such a right, the government bears the burden of persuasion.77  “To 
satisfy strict scrutiny, [the government] must prove that the conduct infringing 
claimant’s fundamental right was undertaken to further a compelling interest.”78  
Furthermore, “[the government] must prove that the challenged government action 
is necessary to further the compelling interest.”79  It is telling that, substantively, the 
government may only meet its burden by producing a compelling interest to justify 
it: if the government’s interest must be compelling to overcome the individual’s 
interest in exercising a fundamental right, then the individual’s interest must, as to 
its weight, be something very nearly compelling itself. 
In substantive due process (and some equal protection) cases, then, the burden 
of persuasion is laded in favor of the party with the presumptively superior interest 
at stake, or, if you will, against (and on) the party with the presumptively inferior 
interest at stake.  Which party’s interest is superior or inferior to the other’s 
depends, in turn, on whether the individual right at issue is fundamental (if it is, 
then the individual’s interest is superior to the government’s, and if it is not—if it is 
merely a low-level right—then the government’s interest is presumptively superior 
to the individual’s). 
Sometimes Congress creates a strict scrutiny standard in a statute.  Take, for 
                                                                    
75  Id. at 633–35 (footnotes omitted). 
76  See, e.g., Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 652 (8th Cir. 2002) (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–
21) (“[F]undamental rights that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition, 
and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if 
they were sacrificed.’”); see also Olejnik v. England, 147 F. Supp. 3d 763, 777 (W.D. Wis. 2015) (Loken, 
J., dissenting) (likewise explaining that fundamental rights are only those that are deeply rooted 
in history and implicit in the concept of ordered liberty). 
77  See Galloway, Basic Due Process, supra note 71, at 641. 
78  Id. at 639. 
79  Id. at 641. 
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example, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA),80 which applies to, among 
other cases, Free Exercise cases involving federal prisoners.81  RFRA lades the 
burden on a challenger to produce evidence to establish a prima facie case, but then 
lades the burden of persuasion on the government once that evidence is produced: 
[T]o state a prima facie claim under RFRA, an inmate must demonstrate that prison 
officials (1) substantially burdened a (2) sincerely held (3) religious belief, and these 
requirements are the same in each circuit.”82  Then “the burden of persuasion shifts, and 
the defendants must . . . prove that the restriction furthers a ‘compelling governmental 
interest[]’ [and] . . . that the challenged burden is the ‘least restrictive means’ 
[available].83 
Why did Congress create such an exacting statutory standard?  Because given 
the importance of the individual’s interest in religious freedom, it was dissatisfied 
with the legal framework that emerged from court decisions under the 
Constitution’s Free Exercise Clause: 
Put simply, suits brought under the Free Exercise Clause are exceedingly deferential to 
prison administrators.  Even when an inmate can show a prima facie violation of the 
right to free exercise under the First Amendment, the defendants win if the challenged 
restriction is deemed “reasonable,” a low standard akin to the rational-basis test used 
elsewhere in constitutional law.  On the other hand, once an inmate has demonstrated 
a prima facie violation of RFRA . . . , prison administrators must justify their action by 
overcoming strict scrutiny, a much higher standard.84 
So it is not always a court that sees an interest as sufficiently important to lade the 
burden on one party or the other; legislatures may do so as well.  Since Congress has 
done it before in other contexts, the Senate should have no difficulty lading burdens 
of production and persuasion in judicial-nominee hearings.  This would seem 
preferable to plunging the nation into another standard-less melee the next time a 
controversial nominee steals the national stage.  Dangers abound when such 
standards are either lacking or confused. 
Affirmative-action cases provide an especially illuminating exemplar of the 
struggle involved in lading burdens of proof when there are strong interests on both 
                                                                    
80  Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb–2000bb-
4). 
81  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c) (LEXIS through PL 115-281); T.W. Brown, Ensuring the Application 
of RFRA and RLUIPA in Pro Se Prisoner Litigation, 41 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 29 passim (2014) (discussing 
the application of the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause and RFRA to prisoners in federal 
penitentiaries). 
82  Brown, supra note 81, at 41 (footnotes omitted). 
83  Id. at 42. 
84  Id. at 31 (footnotes omitted). 
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sides—and the confusion that results from indecision as to which party is laded 
with what burden.  In affirmative-action cases, generally, when a governmental 
actor uses ethnic heritage as a factor in admissions or hiring, strict scrutiny applies 
(as it does to any case where a law or policy facially draws lines involving ethnicity).85  
But in the most recent Supreme Court case on the issue, Fisher v. University of Texas,86 
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, seemed to indulge a “convoluted layering 
of burdens upon burdens” in holding that “the University had carried its burden, or 
more precisely, that [the challenger] had not carried her burden of showing that the 
University had failed to carry its burden.”87 
As Professor George Rutherglen notes: 
Justice Powell tried to do the same thing in his separate opinion in Bakke v. Regents of the 
University of California.  But that opinion, now over 35 years old, “amounted to a 
proclamation of ambivalence that dramatically recognized and proclaimed the 
existence of legitimate moral and constitutional claims on both sides of the issue.”88 
Professor Rutherglen, after discussing the shifting burdens in affirmative-action 
cases (given both the government’s compelling interest in achieving diversity in 
higher education and the constitutional, equal-protection aversion to considering 
ethnicity in governmental lawmaking and policymaking), concluded: 
[T]he University did not really bear the entire burden of proof.  [This perspective on the 
evidence] reveals that the standard for sufficient proof is not social scientific validity 
but something like adherence to managerial best practices.  The legal standard is the 
state of the art, not the state of the science, of admissions decisions in higher education.  
Once a university has shown that it conforms to the state of the art, the burden appears 
to shift back to those attacking affirmative action to identify race-neutral alternatives 
that are both “available” and “workable.”  Shifting the burden of production repeatedly 
among the parties looks more like a relic of common law pleading, in the form of 
declaration, plea, replication, and so on, than it does an effective means of resolving an 
intensely debated constitutional issue.  The implications of the burden of production at 
each stage tend to be subordinated to the end result, creating more equivocation than 
transparency, and leaving the parties with the risk that they might fail to meet an 
uncertain burden of proof.89 
This seems a wise admonition to bear in mind as lawmakers consider where to 
                                                                    
85  See generally Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 
265 (1978). 
86  136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
87  Id. at 2214; Rutherglen, Whose Burden, supra note 28, at 19. 
88  Rutherglen, Whose Burden, supra note 28, at 21 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316–17). 
89  Id. at 30–31 (footnotes omitted). 
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lade the burdens of production and persuasion in judicial-nominee proceedings.  It 
won’t do to lade the burden on one party and then require the other party to show 
that the laded party has not met its burden.  As Professor Rutherglen cogently noted, 
the burden cannot be on both parties at once.90  Were it on both parties at once, then 
a factfinder would have no means of evaluating which party to reward or punish for 
failing to meet its obligation to produce or persuade. 
b. Balancing Tests 
Courts also consider which party has the greater or lesser interest when they 
formulate balancing tests that, in turn, sometimes lade the burden on one side in a 
constitutional dispute.91  Consider Marsh v. Alabama,92 in which the Supreme Court 
addressed whether a company-owned town could prohibit Jehovah’s Witnesses 
from distributing literature in its town: 
Many people in the United States live in company-owned towns.  These people, just 
as residents of municipalities, are free citizens of their State and country.  Just as all 
other citizens they must make decisions which affect the welfare of community and 
nation.  To act as good citizens they must be informed.  In order to enable them to be 
properly informed their information must be uncensored.  There is no more reason for 
depriving these people of the liberties guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments than there is for curtailing these freedoms with respect to any other 
citizen. 
When we balance the Constitutional rights of owners of property against those of 
the people to enjoy freedom of press and religion, as we must here, we remain mindful of 
the fact that the latter occupy a preferred position.  As we have stated before, the right to 
exercise the liberties safeguarded by the First Amendment ‘lies at the foundation of free 
government by free men’ and we must in all cases ‘weigh the circumstances and 
appraise * * * the reasons * * * in support of the regulation of (those) rights.’  In our view 
the circumstance that the property rights to the premises where the deprivation of 
liberty, here involved, took place, were held by others than the public, is not sufficient to 
justify the State’s permitting a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to 
restrict their fundamental liberties and the enforcement of such restraint by the 
application of a State statute.  Insofar as the State has attempted to impose criminal 
punishment on [a Jehovah’s Witness] for undertaking to distribute religious literature 
in a company town, its action cannot stand.93 
The Court could not have been clearer about the burdens when the competing 
                                                                    
90  Id. 
91  See generally Brendan Beery, Tiered Balancing and the Fate of Roe v. Wade: How the New Supreme 
Court Majority Could Turn the Undue-Burden Standard into a Deferential Pike Test, 28 Kan. J.L. & Pub. 
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92  326 U.S. 501 (1946). 
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interests were, on one side, mere control of the use of property and, on the other, 
sacrosanct public interests in religious freedom, free speech, and the availability of 
information that might inform decisions about “the welfare of community and 
nation.”94  Because the company-owned town had the lesser of the interests at stake, 
it bore the burden under a balancing test that favored the other party.95  In other 
cases, the scales may be weighted in favor of the government.96 
For example, one commentator has noted the prevalence of what she calls 
“deferential balancing” in the context of Supreme Court decisions about 
presidential authority in wartime: 
Under the deferential balancing model, the Court examines the reasonableness of the 
President’s actions in a highly deferential manner, allowing infringement of citizens’ 
rights. . . .  
Under the deferential balancing model, the Supreme Court defers to the 
President’s determination that his policies strike the proper balance between defending 
national security and protecting civil liberties during wartime.  Constitutional rights 
normally provided during peacetime are outweighed by the President’s need to conduct 
the war effort.  Scholars who defend the deferential balancing model argue that the 
Court’s defense of constitutional rights during wartime will unduly burden the 
President’s protection of national security.  However, critics of the model argue that the 
Court should review the reasonableness of the President’s actions without such 
deference to determine whether the cost of infringing citizens’ rights outweighs 
national security objectives.97 
So it is possible, even when constitutional rights are at issue, that courts may tip the 
scales in favor of the party with the greater interest—in the case of wartime 
authority, the government—and against the party with the lesser interest—the 
individual.98  In a sense, then, the burden is laded on the individual in such cases.  
This may be so when the public good (for example, national security in wartime) is 
weighed against the rights or activities or interests of a mere individual.  Indeed, 
the Supreme Court, in evaluating burdens of proof generally, has considered 
whether society in general has any real interest in the outcome of a case.99 
In sum, in cases involving more than just the competing interests of private 
parties, but rather more ethereal issues around constitutional or individual-rights 
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96  See id.  
97  Pooya Safarzadeh, The Supreme Court and the President: Toward a Balancing Test with Bite, 10 
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98  See id.  
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issues in particular and public-interest issues more generally, courts and lawmakers 
tend to lade the burden (at least the burden of persuasion) on the party with the 
lesser interest at stake to favor the party with the greater interest at stake.  As will 
be discussed more thoroughly below, because a judicial-nominee hearing or 
proceeding implicates constitutional principles and the public interest, the Senate 
should adopt a similar approach: the party laded with the burden of persuasion 
should not simply be the party making the accusation, but rather the party with the 
lesser interest at stake vis-à-vis the greater public good.100 
2. The Party that Precipitated (Rather than Initiated) the Action or 
Accusation of Wrongdoing When that Party Stands to Gain from a 
Favorable Outcome at the Expense of a Weighty Countervailing 
Interest 
When one party has a weightier interest at stake than the other, courts do not 
just look to which party initiated legal proceedings or accused another of 
wrongdoing in lading the burden of persuasion.  As will be explained immediately 
below, other relevant considerations—again, when some weighty interest is at 
stake—are which party precipitated (as distinguished from initiated) the action by 
moving against the other and which party stands to gain from a favorable outcome. 
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,101 the facts were as follows: 
Florence Dolan, who owned a plumbing and electrical supply store in Tigard’s business 
district, sought a permit from the city to expand her store and parking lot, and to build 
another structure on her land.  Tigard informed Dolan that she could have her permit if 
she met two conditions: first, that she deed to the city the portion of her property lying 
within the floodplain of the adjacent Fanno Creek, and second, that she provide a strip 
of land next to the floodplain for use as a bicycle/pedestrian path.  To justify this 
dedication of over ten percent of Dolan’s property, Tigard claimed that its previously 
adopted comprehensive zoning plan had identified the floodplain as a protected 
greenway that would be strained were Dolan to add additional impervious surface to 
the area, and that the bike path could alleviate the anticipated traffic congestion from 
Dolan’s expanded facility.102 
Dolan challenged the city’s action claiming that it was unconstitutional under 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.103  In a sense, Dolan initiated the 
proceedings at multiple stages—first by applying for the permit, and then by 
                                                                    
100  See infra Part III, section B (2). 
101  512 U.S. 374 (1994). 
102  Marshall S. Sprung, Note, Taking Sides: The Burden of Proof Shift in Dolan v. City of Tigard, 71 
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challenging the city’s conditional grant of the permit and commencing litigation.104  
But it was arguably the city that precipitated the action: the city was the party asking 
for Dolan’s land, and its insistence that she cede her property interests to the city 
was the precipitating cause of the controversy.105  Under these circumstances, the 
Court saw fit to lade the city with the burden of persuasion; as one commentator 
noted: 
[A]lmost matter-of-factly, the Court announced a shift in the burden of proof to the 
government.  However, while it devoted a great deal of effort to its discussion of 
constitutional issues . . . , the Dolan Court chose to make this burden shift without 
extended comment . . . . That a burden of proof shift occurred so quietly, yet coincided 
with considerable advancement in the substantive law, represents a familiar judicial 
tactic. 
Whether subtly achieved as in Dolan or not, burden of proof shifts have been a part 
of some of this nation’s most celebrated cases. . . . [I]n each of these cases . . . the burden 
of proof shift acted as the medium for important substantive legal change. . . . Many of 
the considerations that steer the direction of the substantive law may also motivate a 
reassignment in the burden of proof, and the two have often acted interchangeably. 
While the Court may not have chosen to acknowledge it, the decision in Dolan falls 
well within this tradition. . . . 
In deciding whether Tigard’s demands amounted to a taking, the Dolan Court 
significantly altered the substantive law of regulatory takings: it required that there be 
“rough proportionality” between the government’s demands and the harm it fears from 
development, and it required that the government establish that proportionality.  
Building on the Court’s increasing distrust of government regulation of property, and 
containing forceful rhetoric deploring the marginal status of the Takings Clause, Dolan 
and its burden shift represent another example in the class of cases where burden 
reallocations and substantive legal change reinforce one another. 
. . . [T]he burden shift in Dolan represents the desire of the Court to disadvantage a 
litigating party and its argument.  Seeming to heed the warnings of both public choice 
theorists and property rights advocates that local government cannot be trusted to 
regulate private property, the Dolan majority, through its burden shift, retreated from 
the historical deference accorded to government in the land use area.  However, rather 
than handicap the government with an announcement that all regulatory takings cases 
would now come under a heightened scrutiny review, the Dolan Court chose a more 
subtle but equally significant approach: it demanded that governments come forward 
and justify their regulatory land use decisions to the factfinder.  If this requirement 
amounts to a shift in both the burden of production and the burden of persuasion, local 
governments after Dolan may find land use regulation a far more treacherous task.  Far 
from a mere procedural move, the burden of proof shift in Dolan packs a powerful yet 
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largely unspoken substantive legal punch.106 
This is an astute analysis.  The interplay between burden shifting and more 
substantive legal machinations is often manifest, and again we see that lading the 
burden has much to do with the interests at stake as a substantive matter. 
In Dolan, the Court was protective of the individual right to property and 
suspicious (even dismissive) of the government’s interest,107 which is usually, in 
such a case, a merely local interest involving mundane and practical 
considerations.108  And although the challenger (Dolan) initiated the allegation in 
court,109 in a takings case the government often moves first; the initiation of legal 
proceedings is reactive, not assertive.110  Dolan was reacting to an adverse 
governmental decision, and it was the government that stood to gain from its own 
claim to a portion of her property.111 
In many cases, of course, the party that precipitates the action and stands to 
gain at the expense of another’s interests will be the same party that initiates the 
action.  This is so in a typical torts case, where a plaintiff stands to improve his own 
financial position at the expense of a defendant—to be “made whole” to the extent 
that a court of law can make one whole again after he has suffered an injury or insult 
at the hands of another.112  The same is true in a typical contract action, where again 
a plaintiff seeks damages—at the expense of a defendant—that will inure to the 
plaintiff’s benefit.113  Even in a case where a plaintiff initiates a proceeding and seeks 
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only equitable or injunctive relief, the plaintiff typically stands to gain something: 
the right to do something, for example, or the peace of living without further 
nuisance.114 
In sum, when lading the burden of persuasion, regardless of which party 
initiated a formal legal proceeding, one should consider whose conduct precipitated 
the action or allegation and which party stands to gain at the expense of the 
interests of another. 
3. Which Party Warrants Suspicion or Scrutiny 
Sometimes the burden of persuasion is laded on the party that, given the very 
nature of the case, warrants suspicion and careful scrutiny.115  This is especially true 
in equal protection cases, in which the allegation is usually that the government has 
targeted a discrete and insular minority for disfavored treatment: 
[C]ourts generally consider three factors in determining whether a classification 
deserves special protection under the [Equal Protection Clause of the] Fourteenth 
Amendment: 1) whether the characteristic that marks the classification is immutable; 2) 
whether the class of persons at issue has suffered a history of political powerlessness; 
and 3) whether the characteristic that marks the class has any bearing on one’s ability to 
contribute to and participate in society and its institutions. 
In any equal protection case, regardless of whether the classification at issue is 
suspect, some form of a means-ends test will be applied by a court to determine whether 
the government has improperly targeted some group.  The use of means-ends analyses 
in the equal protection context makes sense; means-ends tests are used to “smoke out” 
improper purposes.  Most parents have applied means-ends tests to their children, even 
if they didn’t know they were doing so.  When a parent comes upon a child who has 
emptied all the ingredients of a dinner recipe (including the egg whites) onto the 
kitchen counter, claiming, “I was just trying to help,” that parent is likely to reply, “Well 
if you were just trying to help, this was not the way to do it.”  What the parent would 
really be saying, of course, is that the reason proffered by the child is bogus; the means 
employed don’t match up with the stated goal, and we’ve smoked out what was really 
going on here: it’s called mischief. 
What kind of means-ends test applies in an equal protection case depends on 
whether the targeted group is deemed to be suspect—based on the three factors noted 
above.  Unfortunately, those factors tend not to be formally realizable (easily applied).  
Most classifications, as one might expect, are non-suspect; laws targeting non-suspect 
groups—like age, income level, health, or, for that matter, criminal disposition—are 
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upheld unless the challenger can show either that the government has no legitimate 
purpose underlying its law or that the means the government has employed do not 
rationally relate to achieving its proffered interest.116 
So generally speaking, in an equal protection case, the identity of the group 
targeted by a governmental law or policy (which one commentator, Professor David 
L. Faigman, nonetheless refers to as the “interest” involved117) determines the level 
of scrutiny to be applied: 
Multitiered tests . . . best exemplify the shifting burdens of persuasion inherently 
a part of constitutional adjudication.  For example, the Court has interpreted the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to mandate a three-tiered analysis that 
directs its review of government purposes and describes the corresponding burdens of 
persuasion.  For rights at the core of the clause, the Court strictly scrutinizes the state 
action and requires the state to demonstrate that its action is necessary to accomplish a 
compelling government interest.  At the clause’s periphery, the Court employs minimal 
scrutiny and requires the challenger to demonstrate that the state action is not rationally 
related to a legitimate state interest.  Certain rights situated between the core and the 
periphery receive intermediate scrutiny, a standard that retains but reduces the burden 
on the state, requiring it to demonstrate that its action is substantially related to an 
important government interest.118 
To be more precise, again, the Equal Protection Clause generally protects groups, 
not rights or interests.119  Nonetheless, Professor Faigman’s explication of tiered 
review and the lading of burdens is helpful.  With regard to interests at or near the 
core of the equality principle, where a court’s suspicion should be at its greatest, the 
burden of persuasion is laded on the government; where the interests at stake lie “at 
the periphery” of concerns about equality, the burden is laded on the challenger.120 
Courts’ use of the terms “suspect class” and “quasi-suspect class” elucidates 
courts’ attitude or posture in these cases: suspicion.121  Where groups that implicate 
the core principles of equal protection are targeted by the government, courts look 
not to the members of the affected class to show that the government has behaved 
badly, but to the government to show that it has not.122  There are cases, then, where 
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evidence of certain innately diabolical conduct might raise an inference of 
wrongdoing that is for the accused to rebut rather than for the accuser to establish 
at some heightened evidentiary threshold (one can see how this might apply in the 
judicial-nominee context).123 
In cases arising under the Free Exercise Clause, as well, courts sometimes have 
their suspicions aroused and apply strict scrutiny, shifting the burden of persuasion 
to the government after the challenger has met its burden of production (despite its 
tendency in many cases to defer to the government, discussed above): 
Prior to 1990, the Free Exercise Clause was understood to require courts to apply strict 
scrutiny analysis to any laws interfering with the free exercise of religion.  When courts 
apply strict scrutiny, the burden of persuasion is always on the government. 
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, however, 
the Supreme Court expressly rejected the assumption that strict scrutiny applies to all 
laws impeding the free exercise of religion.  Smith arose when two Native Americans 
were fired from their jobs because they used peyote, which Oregon classifies as an illegal 
drug.  When their applications for unemployment benefits subsequently were denied 
because they had been fired for misconduct—ingesting peyote—they [sued,] claiming 
that the denial violated the Free Exercise Clause. 
The Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that strict scrutiny should apply, and 
held that the Free Exercise Clause does not exempt activity forbidden by neutral laws of 
general applicability merely because such activity is of a religious nature.  The practical 
result of Smith was that neutral laws, even those that burden the free exercise of religion, 
are subject to rational basis review.  In rational basis review, the plaintiff always has the 
burden of persuasion. 
Smith, however, did not result in the death of strict scrutiny for all Free Exercise 
cases.  Three years later, the Court again faced a Free Exercise challenge in Church of the 
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.  In Lukumi, members of the Santeria religion 
challenged a zoning ordinance . . . [that] forbade ritual animal sacrifices.  The Court 
unanimously held that the zoning ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause. 
The Court distinguished Smith, explaining that strict scrutiny applied because the 
challenged zoning ordinance was not neutral or generally applicable; it was clearly 
enacted to suppress the practice of Santeria.  The ordinance could not survive strict 
scrutiny because the city could employ other means to achieve its purported goals—
protecting public health and preventing cruelty to animals—without burdening the 
exercise of Santeria.  Thus, after Lukumi, non-neutral laws that interfere with the free 
exercise of religion are subject to strict scrutiny.  
Stated alternatively, Smith and Lukumi stand for the proposition that the 
assignment of burdens of proof in Free Exercise claims depends on the challenged 
statute’s neutrality.  If the statute is neutral and generally applicable, the plaintiff has 
the burden of persuasion.  But if a plaintiff produces evidence that a non-neutral law 
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interferes with the free exercise of his religion, the burden of persuasion shifts to the 
government.124 
The same insistence in neutrality applies to governmental taxes imposed on the 
press: 
[T]he Supreme Court has . . . [held] that the burden imposed by . . . tax legislation on the 
press must be necessary to serve a “compelling” or “overriding” governmental interest . 
. . .  
Before this “strict scrutiny” standard is applied, however, the Court first requires 
proof that the tax has in fact substantially burdened the press.  The Supreme Court has 
never suggested that the press is immune from the general forms of taxation necessary 
to sustain the operations of the government.  Instead, it has identified . . . factors which, 
if present in a state’s tax scheme, raise the presumption of unconstitutionality because 
of the substantial burden placed upon the press.  This two-prong analysis—
identification of the discrimination and application of the strict scrutiny standard—has 
become the test to quash unconstitutional means of abridging the freedom of the press 
through discriminatory tax treatment. 
. . . Whether a particular tax scheme is discriminatory is determined by 
distinguishing between a generally applicable tax and a “differential” or “selective” tax.  
Differential taxation of the press is generally defined as taxing members of the media 
in a manner different than that customarily accorded non-media businesses. . . . If 
properly employed, the nondiscrimination principle, exemplified by the two-prong 
analysis, maintains an equitable balance between a government’s privilege to tax and 
the press’ guaranteed freedoms under the Free Press Clause.125 
In both the free exercise cases and the free press taxation cases, we see again 
that the burden of persuasion (once evidence of non-neutrality has been produced) 
follows, i.e., is laded on, the party whose conduct has raised a suspicion that 
something nefarious is afoot. 
I I .  WE I GHT I NG 
Once the burdens of production and persuasion have been laded on the 
appropriate party, the question arises: what quantum or weight of evidence must be 
produced to (a) initiate an investigation; (b) warrant a formal hearing or 
proceeding; and (c) find for or against the parties involved in the controversy.  One 
consideration to keep in mind as we wade through the standards that apply in both 
civil and criminal cases is that a judicial-nominee proceeding, at least as to an 
                                                                    
124  Raccuia, Exclusionary Zoning, supra note 24, at 1873–74 (footnotes omitted) (citing Church of 
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993); Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human 
Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990)). 
125  Gregory S. Asciolla, Note, Leathers v. Medlock: Differential Taxation of the Press Survives Under 
the First Amendment, 41 Cath. U. L. Rev. 507, 508–09 (1992) (footnotes omitted). 
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accusation of disqualifying wrongdoing, is neither, and yet, in some senses, both civil 
and criminal.  A Senate hearing is not a trial at all, either civil or criminal, and yet it 
may involve an allegation of conduct that would meet the elements of a crime—but 
in an arena (a Senate hearing) where the stakes are more akin to a civil case 
(involving no prospect that the losing party will suffer the forfeiture of life or 
liberty126). 
A. Investigation 
At each of three stages of a criminal investigation at the federal level (normally 
conducted, of course, by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)127), the 
production of some evidence is required.  The weights of evidence needed to 
graduate from one stage to the next are spelled out in guidelines promulgated by 
the U.S. Attorney General: 
The lowest level of investigative activity is the “prompt and extremely limited 
checking out of initial leads,” which should be undertaken whenever information is 
received of such a nature that some follow-up as to the possibility of criminal activity is 
warranted.  This limited activity should be conducted with an eye toward promptly 
determining whether further investigation (either a preliminary inquiry or a full 
investigation) should be conducted. 
The next level of investigative activity, a preliminary inquiry, should be undertaken 
when there is information or an allegation which indicates the possibility of criminal 
activity and whose responsible handling requires some further scrutiny beyond 
checking initial leads.  This authority allows FBI agents to respond to information that 
                                                                    
126  See generally Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Civil and Criminal Sanctions in the Constitution and Courts, 
94 Geo. L.J. 1, 15 (2005).  Professor Fellmeth explains: 
 Different theories explaining the distinction between civil and criminal necessarily reflect different 
value judgments about the centrality of individual liberty and dignity to the constitutive order.  In the 
federal and state legal systems of the United States, criminal sanctions are typically conceived of as kinds 
of punishment, and . . . punishment “must (by anyone who takes liberty to be an important moral value) 
be considered prima facie wrong and in need of moral justification.” 
Id. 
127  See Anthony R. Gordon, A Day in the Life of an FBI Agent, 5 Nev. Law. 28, 28 (Nov. 1997).   
As the former Special Agent describes: 
 A day in the life of an FBI Special Agent can be as varied as the type of work conducted by the FBI.  
Being the primary investigative agency for the United States Department of Justice, 
the FBI’s investigative jurisdiction ranges from the traditional violent crime and fugitive work to 
domestic and international terrorism, organized crime and drug investigations, civil rights enforcement, 
public corruption, and white collar crime. 
Id. 
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is ambiguous or incomplete.128 
A formal investigation, as opposed to a mere inquiry, requires a higher 
threshold (greater weight) of evidence, which must of course be developed by the 
law enforcement agency itself.  The agency acts as both the agent of the real party in 
interest (the United States) and, in a sense, as a proxy for the victim or victims of 
the alleged crime129: 
A general crimes investigation may be initiated where facts or circumstances 
reasonably indicate that a federal crime has been, is being, or will be committed.  
Preventing future criminal activity, as well as solving and prosecuting crimes that have 
already occurred, is an explicitly authorized objective of general crimes investigations.  
The “reasonable indication” threshold for undertaking such an investigation is 
substantially lower than probable cause.130 
When discussing when the FBI would open an investigation (particularly in a 
counterterrorism case), former FBI Director James Comey explained that the FBI 
would first need to find “a credible allegation of wrongdoing or reasonable basis to 
believe that an American may be acting as an agent of a foreign power.”131  In other 
words, not just any allegation or basis will do: there must be some assessment, even 
at this stage, of the reliability of evidence. 
                                                                    
128  The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism 
Enterprise Investigations, EPIC, https://www.epic.org/privacy/fbi/FBI-2002-Guidelines.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4GSG-Y6E5] (last visited Feb. 25, 2019) [hereinafter FBI Guidelines]. 
129  There is scarce literature on the relationship between a law-enforcement agency like the FBI 
and the crime victims with whom FBI agents work.  There is considerable scholarship, however, 
about the prosecutor-victim relationship; to the extent that the prosecutor-victim relationship 
mirrors the law-enforcement-and-victim relationship, the scholarship is helpful.  See, e.g., Bennett 
L. Gershman, Prosecutorial Ethics and Victims’ Rights: The Prosecutor’s Duty of Neutrality, 9 Lewis & 
Clark L. Rev. 559, 559–60 (2005).  According to Professor Gershman: 
 The role of the victim in the criminal justice system has increased dramatically in recent years.  
Whereas crime victims in the past lacked any meaningful role in the criminal justice process, crime 
victims today are afforded broad legal protections, including a right to be treated fairly and with dignity, 
a right to restitution for their injuries, a right to be protected from the accused, a right to be notified of 
and to be present at court proceedings, and a right to be heard at critical stages in the proceedings.  These 
protections are not self-executing, however.  At a minimum, their enforcement requires the involvement 
and cooperation of the prosecutor.  Yet despite the prosecutor’s important role in safeguarding the rights 
of victims, there has been little examination of the relationship between prosecutors and victims, and the 
extent to which that relationship implicates ethical rules regulating a prosecutor’s conduct. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
130  FBI Guidelines, supra note 128. 
131  See John Cassidy, Trump’s Russia Problem Is Far from Marginal, New Yorker (Mar. 23, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/donald-trumps-russian-marginalia-problem 
[https://perma.cc/Z53H-GRLF]. 
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B. Formal Proceedings 
To initiate a formal case or proceeding, beyond merely an investigation, an 
accuser or plaintiff generally must establish probable cause: 
Probable cause is not a single standard.  The phrase is used by courts to describe the 
justification needed to support either criminal proceedings or civil proceedings; but the 
showing required for the first is greater than the showing required for the second.  
Probable cause, then, is best understood to mean “sufficient cause,” where the meaning 
of “sufficient” depends on what follows from the decision. . . .  
. . . Probable cause [in a criminal case] . . . is a reasonable belief that the facts and 
the law support the particular charge made against the accused.  The factual side of the 
standard is a reasonable belief that the accused has acted or failed to act in the manner 
charged.  The legal side is a reasonable belief that those acts or omissions constitute the 
offense at issue.132 
As to civil cases, the rules are understandably looser: 
Probable cause to support a civil claim is an easier standard to satisfy than the 
probable cause needed to justify . . . initiating a criminal charge.  The difference is 
supported by three principal considerations.  First, the less severe consequences of a 
civil judgment also support a less demanding rule to justify the pursuit of it.  Second, 
the public interest is sometimes served by civil lawsuits that advance claims that have 
not yet been recognized by the courts but that have a sound chance of success.  Third, 
civil proceedings sometimes must be brought before significant investigation of the 
facts is possible; the means of conducting such an investigation may become available 
only with commencement of a lawsuit.  Criminal cases more often (though not always) 
are supported at the time they begin by substantial investigation or by firsthand 
knowledge on an accuser’s part.  The confidence required of a civil plaintiff is therefore 
less than that required of an accuser who initiates a criminal prosecution. 
. . . . 
. . . Probable cause to support a civil claim is an objective standard.  The claim must 
reasonably appear to have a legitimate or “sound” prospect of success at the time the 
claim is made .  This does not necessarily mean the claim is likely to prevail.  It means 
the claim is not frivolous.  Sometimes a legitimate claim will have only a small chance of 
acceptance.133 
In a typical civil case at the federal level, a plaintiff must plead in her complaint 
enough “factual matter” to establish a plausible inference that further discovery may 
unearth evidence of wrongdoing by the defendant.134  These pretrial standards are 
designed to separate the wheat from the chaff—the meritorious claims from the 
frivolous nonsense: 
                                                                    
132  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 22 TD (Am. Law Inst. 2018). 
133  Id. § 25 (citations omitted). 
134  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
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The cases can be viewed as addressing a dilemma.  On one hand, if conclusory claims 
are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, there may be a flood of groundless suits 
that threaten to impose high costs—monetary and otherwise—on blameless 
defendants.  On the other hand, if plaintiffs must already possess information that 
adequately inculpates defendants as a prerequisite to discovery—a main purpose of 
which is to give plaintiffs access to information solely in defendants’ possession, posing 
a classic catch-22—important groups of meritorious cases may be eliminated from the 
system.135 
C. Liability or Guilt 
Then there is the matter of the weight of evidence required to establish liability 
or guilt.  In one case, the Supreme Court suggested that the weight of proof required 
in a given case should be a function of society’s interest in the outcome: 
The function of a standard of proof, as that concept is embodied in the Due Process 
Clause and in the realm of factfinding, is to “instruct the factfinder concerning the 
degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the correctness of factual 
conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.”  The standard serves to allocate the 
risk of error between the litigants and to indicate the relative importance attached to 
the ultimate decision. 
Generally speaking, the evolution of this area of the law has produced across a 
continuum three standards or levels of proof for different types of cases.  At one end of 
the spectrum is the typical civil case involving a monetary dispute between private 
parties.  Since society has a minimal concern with the outcome of such private suits, 
plaintiff’s burden of proof is a mere preponderance of the evidence.  The litigants thus 
share the risk of error in roughly equal fashion.136 
Although this approach (the consideration of the interests of society in the outcome 
of a particular case) has drawn criticism from some,137 it seems apt in the context of 
a judicial-nominee proceeding, especially one involving the Supreme Court, where 
the outcome is clearly of so much greater concern than the outcome of litigation 
between two parties whose interests do not implicate national and global 
consequences. 
Distinguishing the preponderance standard from the standards involving 
more serious consequences, the Court explained: 
In a criminal case, on the other hand, the interests of the defendant are of such 
magnitude that historically and without any explicit constitutional requirement they 
have been protected by standards of proof designed to exclude as nearly as possible the 
                                                                    
135  Kaplow, Multistage Adjudication, supra note 20, at 1182–83 (footnotes omitted). 
136  Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979).  
137  See Louis Kaplow, Burden of Proof, 121 Yale L.J. 738, 742–43 (2012) [hereinafter Kaplow, Burden 
of Proof]. 
L A D I N G  A N D  W E I G H T  
263 
likelihood of an erroneous judgment.  In the administration of criminal justice, our 
society imposes almost the entire risk of error upon itself.  This is accomplished by 
requiring under the Due Process Clause that the state prove the guilt of an accused 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[An] intermediate standard, which usually employs some combination of the 
words “clear,” “cogent,” “unequivocal,” and “convincing,” is less commonly used, but 
nonetheless “is no stranger to the civil law.”  One typical use of the standard is in civil 
cases involving allegations of fraud or some other quasi-criminal wrongdoing by the 
defendant.  The interests at stake in those cases are deemed to be more substantial than 
mere loss of money and some jurisdictions accordingly reduce the risk to the defendant 
of having his reputation tarnished erroneously by increasing the plaintiff’s burden of 
proof.  Similarly, this Court has used the “clear, unequivocal and convincing” standard 
of proof to protect particularly important individual interests in various civil cases.138 
So there are various weights that may be assigned to a party’s burden of persuasion 
to achieve a legal win on the merits of a case, ranging from a mere preponderance 
of evidence to proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  And we see again the common 
thread that runs through so much of the discussion about lading and weighting 
burdens: the concern, ultimately, is about the gravity of the interests at stake on 
both sides of a dispute.139 
But a note of caution is in order: one scholar has complained that this whole 
enterprise of sorting out burdens and standards of proof can be arbitrary and 
whimsical.  Professor Roger B. Dworkin wrote: 
The concept of burden of proof exists on a theoretical level because we believe it does. . 
. . Since it performs a bad function unrelated to its theoretical purpose, does not 
perform its supposed function, and badly confuses the law, we should abandon the 
entire notion of a burden of proof in order to simplify the law, stop fooling ourselves, 
and remove a misused tool from the hands of appellate judges.140  
Notwithstanding Professor Dworkin’s anxieties as to the misapprehension of 
burdens of proof in the wrong appellate hands, the Kavanaugh hearings illuminated 
an even more harrowing misadventure: the absence of any clarity as to which party 
has to show what, and by what standard, at any stage of a quasi-judicial proceeding 
underway before a political body.141  Professor Dworkin may have a point, though: 
there is nothing inherently sensible about adhering, in an overly formalistic way, to 
the weights that courts traditionally assign to burdens of persuasion; those weights 
do not address the full range of interests and contexts involved in resolving myriad 
                                                                    
138  Addington, 441 U.S. at 423–24 (footnote and citations omitted).  
139  Id.  
140  Roger B. Dworkin, Easy Cases, Bad Law, and Burdens of Proof, 25 Vand. L. Rev. 1151, 1153 (1972). 
141  See Roberts, Hearing Isn’t a Trial, supra note 19. 
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different species of cases and controversies. 
Professor Louis Kaplow offers an instructive illustration: 
To introduce evidence and the setting of an evidence threshold, consider a simple 
and reasonably familiar example in the medical context: the use of test results to 
determine whether to treat a patient—perhaps to administer a drug, perform surgery, 
or employ a more invasive follow-up diagnostic procedure.  The test is an imperfect 
signal, higher scores indicating a greater likelihood that the disease in question is 
present.  That is, individuals who truly have the ailment produce a range of test results, 
but their scores cluster toward the high end, whereas individuals who really are disease-
free also produce a range of results, but their scores cluster toward the low end.  The 
problem is to choose a cutoff or threshold, above which treatment will be applied.  A high 
cutoff will result in few false positives, which is to say that only a small portion of 
disease-free individuals will be mistakenly given the treatment; however, a high cutoff 
will also result in many false negatives, so a nontrivial fraction of diseased individuals 
will mistakenly fail to receive treatment.  In determining the optimal threshold, these 
error costs will be traded off: if nontreatment of diseased individuals is serious and the 
treatment involves little cost to disease-free individuals, a low cutoff will be optimal, but 
if nontreatment is only moderately problematic whereas treatment is very costly to 
disease-free individuals, a high cutoff will be optimal.142 
Applying the principles underlying this example, Professor Kaplow explains that 
there is nothing magical about the standards we generally apply in legal cases, 
including the preponderance standard: 
An immediate implication . . . is that, depending on the context, the optimal 
evidence threshold could be much more demanding or notably more lax than the 
preponderance rule (or a requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt).  For 
example, if much benign activity might be chilled and the harmful acts in question cause 
little social loss and are mostly undeterrable in any event, very strong evidence should 
be required for liability.  In contrast, if there is little prospect of chilling beneficial 
activity and the pertinent harmful acts impose extreme damage and might readily be 
deterred, a low threshold should be employed.143 
Setting the optimum threshold (or what we might call the proper quantum or 
weight of evidence required to persuade), then, requires, essentially, that we 
evaluate the risk of error that is tolerable in light of the gravity of the consequences 
when an error occurs.144  This is not altogether inconsistent with existing Supreme 
Court case law, but that case law focuses on constitutional due process rather than 
the narrow question of what weight should be assigned to the burden of persuasion 
in a given type of case (although, as we will see shortly, these due process principles 
                                                                    
142  Kaplow, Burden of Proof, supra note 137, at 756. 
143  Id. at 748 (footnote omitted). 
144  See id. 
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certainly do apply in that context).145 
In Mathews v. Eldridge,146 the Supreme Court ruled that, as a matter of 
procedural fairness, the process to which a litigant is due depends on three factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the risk of 
an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the 
Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and 
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would 
entail.147 
So, for example, a state may not terminate the custodial rights of a parent on a mere 
showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the parent is neglectful.148  In 
Santosky v. Kramer,149 the Supreme Court stated that parents have a “vital interest in 
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”150  As to the adequacy 
of the preponderance standard in light of this vital interest, the Court stated: 
A standard of proof that . . . demands consideration of the quantity, rather than the 
quality, of the evidence may misdirect the factfinder in the marginal case.  Given the 
weight of the private interests at stake, the social cost of even occasional error is 
sizable.151 
The Court concluded that “a stricter standard of proof would reduce factual error 
without imposing substantial fiscal burdens upon the State.”152  Based on these 
findings, the Court held that a state may not deprive a person of his or her parental 
rights by anything less than a “clear and convincing evidence” standard.153 
The Court’s analysis in Santosky tracks relatively well with the optimal threshold 
approach proposed by Professor Kaplow.  Given the relatively low cost to the state 
of proving a case by a higher standard, the seriousness of the consequences of 
making a mistake, and the risk of making such a mistake under a low threshold of 
proof, the Court settled on a higher threshold that would minimize (or at least 
                                                                    
145  See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
146  424 U.S. 319 (1976). 
147  Id. at 335.  
148  See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 747–48 (1982).  
149  455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
150  Id. at 753. 
151  Id. at 764 (citation omitted). 
152  Id. at 767.  
153  Id. at 748.  
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reduce) the risk of error.154  To play off of Professor Kaplow’s metaphor,155 let us 
conceptualize the “disease” the state was trying to “treat” as child neglect—a serious 
disease, to be sure.  The state set the evidentiary threshold at a low level (a mere “fair 
preponderance”156), presumably because the seriousness of the “disease” warranted 
more “treatment” than less—better to tackle the disease aggressively than to leave 
it untreated in too many cases.  What the state failed to consider, on the Supreme 
Court’s analysis, was that “treating” a “patient” who didn’t actually have the 
“disease” could be harmful on an order of magnitude approximating fatality.157  And 
given the costs associated with “treating” a “healthy” person, the state should have 
set the threshold much higher.158 
I I I .  L ADI NG AND WE I GHT I NG I N J UDI C I A L - N O MI N E E  P R O C E E DI N GS  
There are four broad functions performed by law-enforcement agencies or 
courts as a legal case progresses in time: (1) investigation; (2) the initiation of formal 
proceedings; (3) litigation and deliberation; and (4) appeal and correction of error.159  
Judicial-nominee hearings generally involve only investigation, deliberation, and, 
in a sense, litigation.160  The initiation function in a typical legal case (the stage 
where a prosecutor in a criminal case produces an indictment or a plaintiff in a civil 
case files a complaint that states a recognized claim, for example) is supplanted in 
judicial-nominee hearings by the constitutional prerogative of the President to 
make an appointment, ostensibly with the advice of the Senate.161  There is no 
appeal, so that stage of legal litigation is inapposite in the context of a judicial-
nominee hearing. 
As to its obligation to consent162 (or dissent), however, the Senate retains an 
                                                                    
154  Id. at 764. 
155  See Kaplow, Burden of Proof, supra note 137, at 756. 
156  Santosky, 455 U.S. at 747. 
157  See id. at 753. 
158  See id. at 764. 
159  See generally Alexandra D. Lahav, Procedural Design, 71 Vand. L. Rev. 821 (2018). 
160  See Denis Steven Rutkus, Supreme Court Appointment Process: Roles of the President, Judiciary 
Committee, and Senate, Cong. Research Serv. 1, 21–22 (Feb. 19, 2010), https://fas.org/sgp/crs
/misc/RL31989.pdf [https://perma.cc/KX9D-N3HH] (“Since the late 1960s, the Judiciary 
Committee’s consideration of a Supreme Court nominee almost always has consisted of three 
distinct stages—a pre-hearing investigative stage, followed by public hearings, and concluding 
with a committee decision on what recommendation to make to the full Senate.”). 
161  See U.S. Const. art. II § 2. 
162  See id. 
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investigatory function—both to evaluate the qualifications and suitability of the 
nominee and to undertake whatever factfinding is required as a result of credible 
allegations of wrongdoing against the nominee.163  The Senate may also deliberate 
based on the evidence adduced—debating both (a) whether the nominee is 
generally qualified and suitable for office;164 and (b) whether any specific and 
credible allegation against the nominee is, notwithstanding the nominee’s other 
credentials and attributes, disqualifying.165 
We should therefore bifurcate the judicial-nominee hearing process into two 
species of inquiry: the qualification inquiry (in which the Senate investigates and 
debates about the nominee’s credentials, general reputation for good character, 
neutrality, judicial temperament, and expertise, for example)166 and the allegation 
inquiry (in which specific allegations of wrongdoing may emerge, requiring 
additional factfinding investigation and additional deliberation as to the suitability 
of the nominee).167  Burdens of proof in both dimensions—lading and weighting—
are involved in both species of inquiry. 
A. The Qualification Inquiry 
Recall that commentators have suggested the following factors for lading 
burdens of production and persuasion: 
§ Which party “seeks to change the status quo” or raise issues that “are 
disfavored or unusual.” 
§ Which party “has knowledge and access to information.” 
§ “Whether the burden follows the natural order of storytelling.”168 
A federal judicial nominee, particularly to the Supreme Court, can move the 
                                                                    
163  See Rutkus, supra note 160, at 22–24 (describing the extensive investigative proceedings 
typically available to and undertaken by the Senate Judiciary Committee in Supreme Court 
nomination proceedings). 
164  See Carolyn B. Lamm, A Proud Tradition, 96 A.B.A. J. 10 (Apr. 2010) [hereinafter Lamm, A Proud 
Tradition] (describing the work of the American Bar Association as evaluating judicial nominees 
as to their “integrity, professional competence and judicial temperament”). 
165  See Dennis E. Curtis, The Fake Trial, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1523, 1523 (1992) [hereinafter Curtis, Fake 
Trial] (“The Senate Judiciary Committee’s handling of the charges by Anita Hill against Clarence 
Thomas had a more than superficial resemblance to a criminal proceeding.”). 
166  See Lamm, A Proud Tradition, supra note 164. 
167  See Curtis, Fake Trial, supra note 165.  
168  See supra Part I, section B and accompanying notes. 
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ideological needle of the federal judiciary considerably.169  So it is typically the 
nominee who seeks to change the status quo (or, one supposes, to preserve it, to 
equal effect). And obviously it is the nominee who has access to his or her own 
thinking, records, and writings.  As to storytelling, judicial-nominee hearings have 
become a “very public stage [that] serves as an important site for storytelling about 
America’s highest court, about the people we deem fit to sit there, and about justice 
more generally.”170  That is a story to be told by various individuals of varying 
opinions, but ultimately, of course, by the nominee himself or herself.171 
So it seems an unremarkable proposition that, as to the qualification inquiry, 
the nominee should be the laded party, both as to the burden of production and the 
burden of persuasion.  And given the grave societal interests at stake, he or she 
should be required to show by something approximating clear and convincing 
evidence that he or she is suitable; in other words, in the context of the qualification 
inquiry, the nominee should produce a considerable weight of evidence. 
B. The Allegation Inquiry 
Here is where much analysis is required in appropriately lading and weighting 
the burdens of production and persuasion.  While it seems clear that a nominee 
should have both burdens as to establishing his or her own bona fides relating to the 
Senate’s qualification inquiry, the nominee will not be the one in possession of the 
testimony or evidence against his or her own self, and he or she will not be the one 
with a story to tell. 
As discussed above,172 to initiate formal proceedings in federal court, a plaintiff 
must establish in her complaint “plausible grounds to infer . . . that discovery will 
reveal evidence of [illegality].”173  This federal standard (plausible evidence) was 
reflected (although seemingly not intentionally) in an op-ed piece about the 
Kavanaugh proceedings penned by Professor Caprice Roberts, who wrote, “[e]ven if 
senators aren’t sure what, if anything, happened between Ford and Kavanaugh, if 
they think the accusation is probable, or even plausible, and decide that it’s too great 
                                                                    
169  See generally, e.g., Brendan T. Beery, Prophylactic Free Exercise: The First Amendment and Religion 
in a Post-Kennedy World, 82 Alb. L. Rev. (forthcoming, 2019); Beery, How to Argue, supra note 41; 
Beery, Rational Basis, supra note 115; Beery, Tiered Balancing, supra note 91. 
170  Patrick Barry, Sites of Storytelling: Supreme Court Confirmation Hearings, 94 Ind. L.J. 
Supplement 1, 2 (2018). 
171  See id. at 1 (“Supreme Court confirmation hearings have an interesting biographical feature: 
before nominees even say a word, many words are said about them.”). 
172  See supra Part II, section B and accompanying notes. 
173  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). 
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a risk to put a maybe-sexual-assaulter on the high court, they’re entitled to vote 
no.”174 
But in either a civil or criminal case, some factual basis rising to the level of 
probable cause (probably somewhere between that associated with a criminal case 
and that associated with a civil case), or “sufficiency” of evidence, must have been 
laid as a predicate.175  It seems reasonable to conclude, then, that as to an allegation 
of wrongdoing that is potentially disqualifying, the accuser should be laded with the 
burden of production, at least as to the stages of the judicial-nominee proceedings 
most closely associated with their investigatory function or, arguably, the beginning 
stages of litigation (the initiation of formal proceedings).  And as to its weight, as 
suggested above, the evidence must establish that the allegation is plausible and 
that there are reasonable grounds for believing that the allegation is true.  Recall 
that, before an allegation may warrant even a preliminary inquiry or formal 
investigation, it must be shown that the allegation is credible and reliable.176  Recall 
also that when an allegation seems wholly implausible (one might imagine that the 
nominee was in a different country at the time of the alleged wrongdoing, for 
example), corroborating evidence might be required.177 
Beyond bearing the burden of production at the investigation and preliminary 
litigation stages of the proceedings, questions around lading and weighting become 
more difficult—as they relate, of course, to the ultimate burden of persuasion 
bearing on the decision whether to seat the nominee.  As will be discussed below, 
this is especially so because it is not clear, as a matter of procedural due process, that 
once a nominee has been credibly accused of wrongdoing, he or she is entitled to 
any process at all. 
1. Does a Judicial Nominee Have a Cognizable Interest in Obtaining 
a Seat? 
Before deciding what burdens of proof should be laded on whom (and the 
weight of the burdens so laded) after a credible allegation has been established, I 
address whether a judicial nominee facing a Senate hearing or proceeding is really 
entitled to any due process at all.  “The requirements of . . . due process apply only to 
the deprivation of . . . liberty and property. . . . [T]he range of interests protected by 
procedural due process is not infinite.”178 
                                                                    
174  Roberts, Hearing Isn’t a Trial, supra note 19. 
175  Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liab. for Econ. Harm § 22 TD (Am. Law Inst. 2018). 
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177  See Anderson, The Legacy, supra note 49, at 973. 
178  Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569–70 (1972). 
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And what interests are at stake in a judicial-nominee hearing or proceeding?  
One assumes that the answer to that question may vary from case to case, but the 
Kavanaugh hearings seemed illustrative: the nominee’s primary concerns seemed 
to be that, were the Senate to act on the allegation against him (finding it to be 
credible and plausible, thereby denying him a seat on the Supreme Court), then it 
would deprive him of (1) his reputation and good name; and (2) the seat to which he 
aspired on the nation’s highest court.179  
As to his reputation, then-Judge Kavanaugh lamented during his opening 
statement during the hearing on Dr. Ford’s accusation that “[t]his has destroyed my 
family and my good name.  A good name built up through decades of very hard work 
and public service at the highest levels of the American government.”180  But one’s 
good name is not necessarily (standing alone, at least) a liberty or property interest 
that implicates due process protections.  In Paul v. Davis,181 a citizen who was 
accused by police of shoplifting, whose name and visage were posted at retail stores 
even before he had been convicted, claimed that the postings deprived him of due 
process.182  The Supreme Court disagreed: 
But the interest in reputation alone which respondent seeks to vindicate in this action 
in federal court is quite different from the “liberty” or “property” recognized in [prior] 
decisions.  [The] law does not extend to respondent any legal guarantee of present 
enjoyment of reputation which has been altered as a result of petitioners’ actions.  
Rather his interest in reputation is simply one of a number which the State may protect 
against injury by virtue of its tort law, providing a forum for vindication of those 
interests by means of damages actions.  And any harm or injury to that interest, even 
where as here inflicted by an officer of the State, does not result in a deprivation of any 
“liberty” or “property” recognized by state or federal law . . . . For these reasons we hold 
that the interest in reputation asserted in this case is neither “liberty” nor “property” 
guaranteed against state deprivation without due process of law.183 
Although one’s good name, standing alone, is not a property or liberty interest 
that implicates due process protections, then-Judge Kavanaugh also had it in mind 
that he was entitled to take a seat on the Supreme Court: 
I will not be intimidated into withdrawing from this process.  You’ve tried hard.  You’ve 
given it your all.  No one can question your effort, but your coordinated and well-funded 
effort to destroy my good name and to destroy my family will not drive me out.  The vile 
                                                                    
179  Kavanaugh Transcript, supra note 18. 
180  Id. 
181  424 U.S. 693 (1976). 
182  Id. at 696. 
183  Id. at 711–12. 
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threats of violence against my family will not drive me out.184 
So Justice Kavanaugh certainly had a passion and determination around getting that 
seat.  Perhaps in this way he signaled that his interest in employment, and his 
interest in serving in particular on the nation’s highest court, was an interest 
concrete enough to warrant due process protections. 
Any claim by a judicial nominee to a constitutionally protected property or 
liberty interest in employment, as applied to a seat on the federal bench, would seem 
tenuous at first blush.  In Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth,185 the Supreme 
Court took up the case of a non-tenured university professor who was informed, 
after completing his contractual term spanning one academic year, that his contract 
would not be renewed.186  The Court stated: 
The Fourteenth Amendment’s procedural protection of property is a safeguard of 
the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits.  These 
interests—property interests—may take many forms. 
Thus, the Court has held that a person receiving welfare benefits under statutory 
and administrative standards defining eligibility for them has an interest in continued 
receipt of those benefits that is safeguarded by procedural due process.  Similarly, in the 
area of public employment, the Court has held that a public college professor dismissed 
from an office held under tenure provisions, and college professors and staff members 
dismissed during the terms of their contracts, have interests in continued employment 
that are safeguarded by due process.  Only last year, the Court held that this principle 
‘proscribing summary dismissal from public employment without hearing or inquiry 
required by due process’ also applied to a teacher recently hired without tenure or a 
formal contract, but nonetheless with a clearly implied promise of continued 
employment. 
Certain attributes of ‘property’ interests protected by procedural due process 
emerge from these decisions.  To have a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly 
must have more than an abstract need or desire for it.  He must have more than a unilateral 
expectation of it.  He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it.  It is a 
purpose of the ancient institution of property to protect those claims upon which people 
rely in their daily lives, reliance that must not be arbitrarily undermined.  It is a purpose 
of the constitutional right to a hearing to provide an opportunity for a person to 
[vindicate] those claims.187 
Under these principles, it seems dubious that a judicial nominee would have 
any interest at all that would entitle him or her to be heard and to defend against 
credible allegations of wrongdoing.  But the notion that a nominee has no due 
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process rights at all is undercut by two considerations.  First, in Roth, the Court 
noted: 
The State, in declining to rehire the respondent, did not make any charge against 
him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his community.  It 
did not base the nonrenewal of his contract on a charge, for example, that he had been 
guilty of dishonesty, or immorality.  Had it done so, this would be a different case.  For 
‘(w)here a person’s good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of 
what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are 
essential.’188 
The Court then observed: “[i]n the present case, however, there is no suggestion 
whatever that the respondent’s ‘good name, reputation, honor, or integrity’ is at 
stake.”189  So it seems that although reputation alone is not a liberty or property 
interest, it may acquire the rank of such an interest when joined with some concrete 
harm being inflicted by the government.  In the Kavanaugh hearings and in any 
future judicial-nominee hearings where salacious allegations are made, we 
obviously have a different matter than the facts presented in Roth: no fair-minded 
observer would deny that Justice Kavanaugh’s good name, reputation, honor, and 
integrity hung in the balance. 
Nonetheless, Roth involved someone who had already held a position and then 
was let go; it did not involve someone who had never acquired a position in the first 
place.  It seems unlikely that then-Judge Kavanaugh could have acquired a 
legitimate expectation of continued employment during a process designed to 
determine whether he would get the job to begin with.  In this sense, Roth seems not 
to suggest, on its own, that somebody in the position of a judicial nominee before 
the Senate has any claim to any process at all. 
But then-Judge Kavanaugh held among his effects something that the 
employees discussed in Roth did not: a presidential nomination190 that, when 
blessed with the consent of the Senate, constituted an appointment to the position 
he sought—as a constitutional matter.191  So even though a nominee to the federal 
bench does not likely have a property or liberty interest in obtaining the position, he 
                                                                    
188  Id. at 573 (citing Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433, 437 (1971); Peters v. Hobby, 349 
U.S. 331, 352 (1955) (Douglas, J., concurring); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191 (1952); Joint 
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 
316–17 (1946)). 
189  Id. 
190  See Senate Judiciary Committee’s Nomination Actions in the 115th Congress, Congress.gov, 
https://www.congress.gov/nomination/115th-congress/2259 [https://perma.cc/V4FG-D8MP] (last 
visited Feb. 26, 2019). 
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or she does have a constitutional interest in obtaining the position—not just incident 
to his own whims and aspirations, but also incident to the President’s own 
constitutional authority, subject, of course, to the consent of the Senate.192  
In this sense, it was more rhetorical gamesmanship than careful constitutional 
interpretation that led so many politicians and commentators to opine that a Senate 
confirmation hearing is nothing more than a “job interview.”193  Given that a 
potentially disqualifying allegation against a nominee for a seat on a federal court 
implicates both the nominee’s reputation and integrity and also some 
constitutionally sensitive interests, we should conclude that such a nominee, even 
if his interest is de minimis, should be afforded some due process, an opportunity 
to clear his name, and, if he meets an appropriate threshold of proof, to take a seat 
on the bench. 
It would seem also that the interest of the nominee in being seated, and of the 
President in having the nominee seated, is strengthened when the Senate has 
already concluded, as to its qualification inquiry (and divorced from any salacious 
or scandalous wrongdoing) that the nominee is otherwise qualified and suitable for 
office.  And of course, the Senate’s constitutional obligation to advise and consent 
can be read as a mandate that the Senate undertake fair processes in assessing a 
nominee once the President has selected one.194  This, of course, would have given 
rise to a colorable claim by Merrick Garland that he—and by extension President 
Obama—were denied due process when the Senate failed to fulfill its constitutional 
obligation to give him a hearing.195  Meritorious as any such claim might have been, 
there likely would have been no judicial remedy available.196 
                                                                    
192  See id. 
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Put simply, a presumptively qualified individual, having been nominated by the 
president and requiring the focus of the Senate as it undertakes its obligation to 
advise and consent, likely has some reasonable expectation (which is not to say 
unfettered entitlement to the seat itself) of some process rooted in principles of 
fundamental fairness before he or she is denied a seat on the federal bench. 
2. The Burden of Persuasion—Lading in an Allegation Inquiry 
Again, as to an allegation of wrongdoing, the accuser should have the burden of 
production, which, if it is satisfied, triggers some level of due process for the 
nominee.  But to say that the nominee is entitled to due process is not to say that the 
nominee should be the favored party as to the lading and weight of the burden of 
persuasion.  
Once the Senate has concluded that a nominee is otherwise qualified and 
suitable for office, and once some interest, however minimal, has vested in the 
nominee, it is then that the most involved question emerges: what standards should 
apply to proceedings resulting from an allegation of wrongdoing that is potentially 
disqualifying? 
Some of the factors commentators have discussed as guiding the lading of the 
burden of persuasion militate against lading the burden of persuasion on the 
nominee.197  First, the nominee is at a disadvantage when it comes to possessing or 
gathering evidence and rebutting the allegation;198 this is especially so when the 
allegation, as in the Ford-Kavanaugh matter, stems from an incident long ago.  
Second, the accuser rather than the nominee has the story to tell in this phase of the 
Senate’s inquiry.199  Third, there is a sense in which the accuser “started it” all by 
leveling the allegation in the first place, and this argues for lading the burden of 
persuasion on the accuser. 
But the inclination to lade the burden of persuasion on the accuser does not 
hold up under more salient factors in cases involving the broad public interest.  I 
consider them one at a time. 
a. The Interests at Stake200 
 While it may be so that a nominee has some interest in obtaining a seat once 
nominated, that interest dims into near obscurity when juxtaposed against the 
                                                                    
Senate consent presents a non-justiciable political question); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) 
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glaring interests of all society involved in seating federal judges—particularly, of 
course, on the Supreme Court.  To take the most conspicuous example, consider 
that President Ronald Reagan nominated the late Robert Bork for the seat that was 
ultimately occupied, after Bork’s nomination foundered, by Anthony M. Kennedy.201  
How important is a Supreme Court seat to society?  Had Robert Bork rather than 
Anthony Kennedy been seated, it is fair to say that we might be living in a different 
kind of society in very fundamental ways.  Take the issue of abortion, for example: 
One can sum up the essence of Robert Bork’s views on abortion by reading a single 
passage from his book Slouching Toward Gomorrah: 
It was argued that abortion on demand would guarantee that every child was 
a wanted child, would keep children from being born into poverty, reduce 
illegitimacy rates, and end child abuse.  Child poverty rates, illegitimacy rates, 
and child abuse have soared.  But it is clear, in any event, that the vast majority 
of all abortions are for convenience. 
In an effort not to belabor the point, suffice it to say that Robert Bork was not a 
proponent of finding any sort of a constitutional right to an abortion. . . . The more 
fundamental question, though, is this: Would Bork, despite his obvious distaste toward 
abortion, nevertheless have voted to uphold Roe v. Wade out of deference to stare decisis . 
. . ? 
It appears . . . that Bork would never have deferred to precedent regarding Roe v. 
Wade. Testifying before Congress in 1981, he proclaimed that Roe was “a serious and 
wholly unjustifiable usurpation of state legislative authority.”  He castigated the 
decision . . . , typically using it as his primary exhibit of how “activist judges” create 
constitutional rights that never actually appeared in the Constitution.  In one speech in 
2010, he announced that Roe had “invented a wholly fictitious right to abortion.”  
“Though they have tried desperately,” he continued, “nobody, not the most ingenious 
academic lawyers nor judges, in the thirty-six years since it was decided has ever 
managed to construct a plausible legal rationale for Roe, and it is safe to say nobody ever 
will.” 
There is, however, [a] wrinkle in Bork’s views on abortion.  In 1981, . . . Bork . . . 
oppose[d] the notion of a “Human Life Bill.”  Among other things, the Bill defined “life” 
as beginning from the moment of conception. . . . To the surprise of his supporters, 
though, Bork spoke out against the Bill.  In essence, he argued that it would be wrong 
for Congress to pass a law abridging a freedom that the Supreme Court had held to be a 
constitutionally protected right.  Ultimately, the Bill was never passed. 
However, it still appears unlikely that Bork’s refusal to support the Human Life Bill 
would signal his . . . acquiescence to . . . Roe.  While Bork protested the notion of Congress 
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overturning the Court’s determination of constitutionality, it appears that he would 
have had no qualms about the Judicial Branch reversing this decision.  Tellingly, in a 
2003 interview, Bork stated that “if the Court makes a bad mistake about the 
Constitution, nobody can cure it except the Court.”  Clearly, Bork view[ed] Roe v. Wade 
as precisely that: “a bad mistake about the Constitution.”  There seems to be little doubt 
that [he would have voted to] “cure it.”202  
And what of Justice Kennedy’s legacy on this issue?  As I have noted elsewhere: 
In one of the more noteworthy uses of his much-ballyhooed “swing vote” on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, Justice Anthony Kennedy sided with Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan in striking down two Texas laws that restricted access to 
reproductive-healthcare facilities by imposing toilsome admitting-privileges and 
surgical-facility standards that clinics had difficulty abiding. 
The proposition that a woman has an unenumerated constitutional right to 
terminate a pregnancy (at least before the point of fetal viability) won the day in 1973.  
But as 2018 fades into 2019, no judicial precedent is more endangered than the one that 
has evolved in a triumvirate of cases: Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and Whole 
Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt (save, perhaps, for the principle that LGBT persons are 
entitled to the equal protection of the laws203).  As one scholar noted in the immediate 
wake of the Hellerstedt decision, “[T]he future of abortion regulation . . . will be affected 
by the makeup of the Court . . . . Assuming that Justice[s] Ginsb[u]rg, Breyer, Kagan, and 
Sotomayor remain for the foreseeable future, the power of Hellerstedt will depend on 
Justice Kennedy remaining on the Court.”  Justice Kennedy, of course, is now gone.204 
So a woman wanting to terminate a pregnancy in a society where doing so is legal 
would, in all likelihood, have inhabited a different legal landscape had Justice 
Kennedy instead been Justice Bork—at least in those states governed by dogmatists 
“hostile to notions of freewheeling individual autonomy in matters relating to 
family, marriage, or reproductive and sexual practices.”205 
On other matters, Robert Bork’s views have been summarized this way: 
He opposed the Supreme Court’s one man, one vote decision on legislative 
apportionment. 
He wrote an article opposing the 1964 civil rights law that required hotels, 
restaurants and other businesses to serve people of all races. 
He opposed a 1965 Supreme Court decision that struck down a state law banning 
contraceptives for married couples. There is no right to privacy in the Constitution, 
Bork said. 
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And he opposed Supreme Court decisions on gender equality, too.206 
Justice Kennedy was not a champion of voting rights207 or laws designed to 
protect the integrity of elections,208 but he never questioned the basic principle of 
one person, one vote.209  He was, in some instances, a champion of civil rights and 
the equality principle, especially as to LGBTQ Americans,210 and he recently voted 
with the majority to uphold public affirmative-action programs.211  He recognized 
personal privacy rights, in fact holding that a mere moral objection to a person’s 
private choices is not a legitimate state interest (prompting the late Justice Antonin 
Scalia to lament “the end of all morals legislation”).212  And he seemed to have no 
qualms with the idea that gender should be treated as a quasi-suspect class in equal 
protection cases.213  
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So in a world where Robert Bork rather than Justice Kennedy had been the 
decisive vote on issues around voting rights, federal civil rights laws, unenumerated 
fundamental privacy rights, and the equality principle generally, we would likely be 
living in a country where abortion was illegal in some states; the federal government 
had diminished authority to ensure civil rights for all citizens; women had 
diminished protections afforded them under the Fourteenth Amendment; public 
affirmative-action programs were illegal in all cases; and LGBTQ Americans, far 
from having anything approaching a right to marry, might still have their private 
sexual practices criminalized at the whim of the political majority.  Some would say 
that this would be a much better world, but the point is simply this: it would be a 
much different world.  The gravity of society’s interest in who sits on the Supreme 
Court—both as to the nature of the interest and its weight—is breathtaking when 
measured against a would-be justice’s (or even a President’s) interest in having a 
particular nominee seated. 
These societal interests, and the interest of society generally and the Senate in 
particular, of avoiding a misjudgment or misadventure in this realm, point to lading 
the burden of persuasion on the nominee, not the accuser, in an allegation inquiry 
involving a federal judicial appointment. 
b. The Party Precipitating the Action and Standing to Gain214 
Although it might seem that an accuser like Anita Hill or Dr. Ford is the one who 
“starts it,” recall that the party initiating an action is not always the one laded with 
the burden of persuasion.215  We must look to what precipitated the accusation of 
wrongdoing and consider which party stands to gain something from the 
proceedings.216  
We learned from the sworn testimony of both Hill and Dr. Ford that the 
precipitating cause of the accusations was not the episodes of wrongdoing in the 
first place (neither Hill nor Dr. Ford publicly accused the alleged wrongdoers at the 
time of the alleged wrongdoing217), but rather the duty each felt to come forward as 
a result of the nominations themselves—and the resulting Senate inquiries into the 
nominees’ characters and backgrounds.218 
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Anita Hill explained in her opening statement before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee: 
It is only after a great deal of agonizing consideration that I am able to talk of these 
unpleasant matters to anyone except my closest friends . . . . These last few days have 
been very trying and very hard for me, and it hasn’t just been the last few days this week. 
It has actually been over a month now that I have been under the strain of this issue. 
Telling the world is the most difficult experience of my life, but it is very close to 
having to live through the experience that occasioned this meeting.  I may have used 
poor judgment early on in my relationship with this issue.  I was aware, however, that 
telling at any point in my career could adversely affect my future career, and I did not 
want early on, to burn all the bridges . . . . 
. . . Perhaps I should have taken angry or even militant steps, both when [the alleged 
wrongdoing occurred] or after I left [the agency where the alleged wrongdoing 
occurred].  But I must confess to the world that the course that I took seemed the better, 
as well as the easier, approach. 
I declined any comment to newspapers, but later, when Senate staff asked me 
about these matters, I felt I had a duty to report.  I have no personal vendetta against 
Clarence Thomas.  I seek only to provide the committee with information which it may 
regard as relevant. 
It would have been more comfortable to remain silent. . . . But when . . . asked by a 
representative of this committee to report my experience, I felt that I had to tell the 
truth.  I could not keep silent.219 
Similarly, in her opening statement before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Dr. 
Ford said: 
I do not recall each person I spoke to about [the alleged] assault.  And some friends 
have reminded me of these conversations since the publication of the . . . story on 
September 16th, 2018.  But until July 2018, I had never named Mr. Kavanaugh as my 
attacker outside of therapy. 
This changed in early July 2018.  I saw press reports stating that Brett Kavanaugh 
was on the shortlist of a list of very well-qualified Supreme Court nominees.  I thought 
it was my civic duty to relay the information I had about Mr. Kavanaugh’s conduct so 
that those considering his nomination would know about this assault. 
On July 6th, I had a sense of urgency to relay the information to the Senate and the 
[P]resident as soon as possible, before a nominee was selected.  I did not know how, 
specifically, to do this.220 
In a very real sense, then, public accusations of the kind involved in the Hill and 
Dr. Ford matters are occasioned not by the wrongdoing, but by the triggering event 
of a Supreme Court nomination—the President making the nomination and the 
                                                                    
219  Testimony to Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 217. 
220  Kavanaugh Transcript, supra note 18. 
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nominee accepting it.  And certainly, the accuser in neither case stood to gain 
anything; both expressed mortification at having to discuss such unsavory, painful, 
and deeply personal matters in such a public forum.221  The party that stands to gain 
in a judicial-nominee proceeding, in either the qualification inquiry or an allegation 
inquiry, is the nominee.  This too cuts in favor of lading the burden of persuasion 
on the nominee, not the accuser. 
c. Which Party Warrants Suspicion and Scrutiny?222 
A person credibly accused of serious wrongdoing under circumstances where 
the accusation is plausible—meaning that the accused had the opportunity and 
capability of committing the wrongful act, and potentially a motive as well223—is a 
person who deserves special scrutiny.  In the same way that an allegation that a state 
actor deserves to be laded with the burden of persuasion when accused of 
interfering with a fundamental right or discriminating against a suspect class,224 an 
allegation that a nominee to a federal judgeship (and again, especially as it relates 
to the Supreme Court) has committed wrongdoing on the level of sexual 
harassment or, worse yet, assault, raises grave societal implications.  Those 
implications involve not just an individual, but, if the allegation is borne out, 
potentially against all society and the Constitution itself.225 
More to the point, however, whatever suspicion or scrutiny might follow the 
accused, none should follow the accuser.  It is one thing for pols and partisans, in a 
frenzy of undisciplined debate, to assert that an accusation against a nominee is 
nothing more than a “political hit”;226 absent any evidence that an accuser is acting 
from political motives, however, and given the nature of the risks associated with 
coming forward, there exists no sound reason to cast a suspicious eye at the party 
making the allegation.  As Dr. Ford stated at the outset of her testimony, “I am here 
today not because I want to be.  I am terrified.”227 
We should be mindful, as well, that a nominee for judicial office does not have 
to stand for confirmation all the way through to an ultimate decision.  He or she is 
                                                                    
221  See Kavanaugh Transcript, supra note 18; Testimony to Senate Judiciary Committee, supra note 217. 
222  See supra Part I, section B (3) and accompanying notes.  
223  See Alison, Tough Tactics, supra note 55, at 417. 
224  See supra Part I, section B (1) and accompanying notes.  
225  This is so because of the vast powers wielded by Supreme Court justices and the self-evident 
importance of the character and integrity of each individual justice in fulfilling his or her 
constitutional obligations under Article III of the Constitution.  See U.S. Const. art. III. 
226  Kavanaugh Transcript, supra note 18.  
227  Id. 
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free, if he or she wishes not to be scrutinized or eyed with suspicion, to withdraw 
from consideration and recede back into the civilities and protocols of his or her 
former life.  Seeking power is not for the meek, and he or she who seeks it is worthy 
of far more scrutiny than anyone trying to stop him or her. 
This factor, too, cuts in favor of lading the burden of persuasion with the 
nominee, not the accuser. 
3. Weighting the Burdens in the Allegation Inquiry 
So the nominee should bear the burden of persuasion on the ultimate question 
whether he or she should be seated on the federal bench in the face of a credible and 
plausible allegation of potentially disqualifying wrongdoing.  The question that 
remains is this: what weight of evidence must the nominee produce to warrant the 
outcome he or she seeks?  It is especially important to keep in mind, as to a “he-said-
she-said” controversy inviting tortured factfinding, that the weighting of the 
burden of persuasion is critical: “each party wants to know the facts he must prove, 
and the fact finder must know what to do when his mind is in a state of 
equilibrium.”228  In particular, “[t]he burden of persuasion is supposed to tell the 
trier of fact what outcome to reach when a decision based on mental conviction is 
impossible.”229  In other words, if one finds that the nominee and the accuser both 
seem credible, then one must use the burden of persuasion as a tiebreaker of sorts: 
when the factfinder can’t decide which one to believe, the factfinder should find 
against the party that failed to meet the appropriate standard. 
We return to our medical analogy.230  The threshold that is optimal—most 
appropriate—is the threshold that best reflects the seriousness of the concerns 
involved, the risks associated with setting the threshold too high or too low, and the 
consequences that might follow from those risks materializing.231 
As we have seen, the implications of a federal judicial appointment could 
scarcely be more serious.  There is some difficulty, however, in assigning the same 
gravity to judicial appointments at three different levels of the federal judiciary.232  
                                                                    
228  Dworkin, supra note 33, at 1158. 
229  Id. at 1160 (footnote omitted).  
230  See Kaplow, Burden of Proof, supra note 137, at 756. 
231  See id.; see also Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). 
232  See Christopher F. Carlton, The Grinding Wheel of Justice Needs Some Grease: Designing the Federal 
Courts of the Twenty-First Century, 6 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 1 (1997) (“The United States 
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All federal judges wield considerable power.  For example, in February 2017, a 
federal district judge halted President Donald Trump’s “travel ban” in an order 
whose reach was nationwide.233  So a single district judge may affect national policy 
with the stroke of a pen.  It goes without saying, however, that a district judge’s 
judgment may be undone by the pens of circuit court judges,234 whose judgments, 
in turn, may vaporize with the pen strokes of a sufficient number of Supreme Court 
justices.235  It is not where judicial power starts, but rather where it ends, that should 
inform the analysis of what standard should apply to what level of judgeship. 
A bad district court appointment—the appointment of a person who lacks the 
mental acuity or strength of character required to do the job—is a serious blunder, 
but one from which all society is generally guarded by the prophylaxis of limited 
jurisdiction and appellate review.236  A bad circuit court appointment is more 
serious, as circuit courts bind up more parties than just those before them, and issue 
rulings that, unlike district court rulings, are unlikely to be reviewed by a higher 
court (seeing as how there is only one higher court remaining, and its review is 
discretionary and generally limited to eighty or so cases per year237). 
A bad Supreme Court appointment (and the seating of a person so morally 
bankrupt and bereft of human empathy as to sexually harass or assault someone 
would certainly constitute a bad appointment) might have catastrophic, national, 
and even international, and potentially generational, implications.238  
It would seem, then, that the Senate should adopt something of a sliding scale: 
                                                                    
The Evarts Act added a third tier to the court system by creating courts of appeals intermediate 
between the trial courts and the Supreme Court.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Introduction to the 
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233  See Washington v. Trump, No. C17-0141JLR, 2017 WL 462040 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 3, 2017). 
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the evidentiary threshold should be set higher for Supreme Court justices than 
circuit judges and higher for circuit judges than district judges.  We should recall, 
also, that there is nothing necessarily optimal about a prefabricated legal standard 
like preponderance of the evidence, clear and convincing evidence, or evidence 
beyond a reasonable doubt.239  And to the extent that an optimal threshold might be 
almost impossible to conjure, I seek here not to identify the exact quantum and 
quality of evidence that a nominee must produce, but merely to suggest ranges that 
might be appropriate. 
In all cases, if the standard for triggering a hearing is that the accusation 
against the nominee be credible, plausible, and reasonable,240 then it stands to 
reason that the nominee’s burden should be to show that the accusation, after 
further development (including the nominee’s own testimony, which, like the 
accuser’s, is direct and valid evidence241), is actually incredible, implausible, or 
unreasonable.  But at what threshold? 
At the district court level, a “diseased” appointee (a reminder: we are speaking 
here metaphorically242)—one who is ill-tempered or undisciplined of mind or 
depraved in his or her character—will impose harm on the parties that come before 
such a judge, but that harm is generally reversible and limited in scope, in most 
cases, to the parties before the judge.243  From a practical standpoint, it is also a more 
pressing need to fill trial court vacancies in the federal judiciary than it is to fill 
Supreme Court vacancies, of which there will rarely ever be more than one at a time, 
and for which suitors abound.244  All this being so, perhaps a district-court nominee 
should have to show (again, this is intended to be a conversation starter, not a 
concrete prescription) that the accusation is somewhat more implausible than 
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plausible (or somewhat more incredible than credible, or somewhat more 
unreasonable than reasonable).  This threshold will catch up fewer bad appointees 
than a more exacting threshold, but at this level of the federal judiciary, the risks 
would be at least somewhat limited; and a threshold like this would arguably be 
appropriate since the consequences of making a mistake are likely to be cabined by 
procedural safeguards built into the judicial system. 
At the other end of the spectrum, we have Supreme Court justices.  Given the 
grave consequences of making a mistake here and given the relatively de minimis 
cost associated with mistakenly “treating” a “healthy” nominee, i.e., depriving a 
wrongly accused nominee of his or her would-be appointment, the threshold should 
be set much higher.  What I mean here is higher for the nominee, but in our medical 
analogy, the threshold for “treatment”—deprivation—would actually be “lower,” 
requiring the Senate to indulge a greater risk that a suitable nominee will be denied 
than that an unsuitable nominee will be seated; the Senate should “treat” more 
“healthy” nominees than it should fail to “treat” “unhealthy” nominees given that the 
failure to “treat” an “unhealthy” nominee could cause catastrophic results—the 
unleashing of a contagion that might infect a whole society.  So, for a Supreme 
Court nominee, it would seem appropriate to require that he or she carry a heavier 
burden—perhaps that, in light of further development, the allegation is highly 
implausible, or manifestly incredible, or patently unreasonable. 
Circuit court nominees, of course, fall somewhere in the middle.245  A bad circuit 
court appointment causes more damage than a bad district court appointment but 
less than a bad Supreme Court appointment, and there is a greater number of 
circuit judges (and thus a greater need to address vacancies), but not as many as 
there are district court vacancies and thus not creating as urgent a need.246  So 
perhaps at this level, the appropriate standard would be something like 
substantially implausible, or palpably incredible, or decidedly unreasonable. 
No matter the level of judgeship at issue or the precise articulation of the 
standard, the burden of persuasion should be weighted in favor of the accuser and 
against the nominee; the burden is the nominee’s as the laded party, and the weight 
of evidence the nominee must produce in the face of a credible and plausible 
allegation should be significant. 
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And one final point: since the burden belongs to the nominee, the accuser is 
entitled to an answer as to his or her allegation.  It was the convenient and slippery 
way out to say, as Senator Susan Collins did, that she believed the accuser was 
credible and powerful in her presentation, but that she also believed that the 
nominee, now-Justice Kavanaugh, was passionate in defense of himself.247  Whether 
a nominee is passionate and forceful is beside the point: Dr. Ford, and much more 
importantly, the whole country, was entitled to hear Senator Collins say that she 
found Dr. Ford’s allegation highly implausible or manifestly incredible or patently 
unreasonable.  Failing that, Senator Collins and her colleagues, given the gravity of 
the interests at stake, the risk of error inhering in a “he was passionate” standard, 
and the potential consequences of a misfire at this level of statecraft, should have 
voted accordingly. 
C ONC L US I ON 
A judicial-nominee hearing, no matter what part or stage or species of inquiry 
it involves, is neither a criminal trial nor a mere job interview.248  It is a 
constitutionally mandated undertaking that pits the interest of the nominee 
against the interests of society in vetting the nominee, sometimes personified by a 
credible individual accuser.  The Senate should adopt rules to lade and weight the 
burdens at each stage of a judicial-nominee proceeding, and it should also take care 
never to conflate its factfinding function—which is akin to legal investigation,249—
with its deliberation function—its duty to decide—when a credible allegation 
against a nominee has been established and the nominee has failed to show that the 
allegation is implausible, whether the allegation is not just potentially, but actually, 
disqualifying. 
As messy as this area of law—burdens of proof, production, and persuasion, 
and the functions of lading and weighting—can be, the Senate should adopt rules 
borrowed from legal proceedings and tweaked to suit the Senate’s factfinding and 
litigating functions.  There is every chance that a controversy like the Kavanaugh-
nomination controversy will erupt again, and the Senate should not repeat the 
mistake it made after the Anita Hill fiasco: its failure to adopt standards and 
procedures that would foster, to the extent possible in a political body, some 
appearance of neutrality, truth-seeking, and good order. 
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